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Putting the Cart Before the Horse 
BARRIERS TO ENFORCING A CODE OF ETHICS FOR 
THOROUGHBRED AUCTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In today’s thoroughbred racing world, sometimes what 
you see is not at all what you get.  Even veteran horsemen will 
admit that “[t]here is a fine line between the showmanship of 
showing a horse at its fullest and fraud.”1  Most surprisingly, 
this deception often begins long before a thoroughbred has even 
run its first race.  Sales practices that may appear fraudulent 
to horse racing outsiders are tolerated, or even accepted as 
customary practice, at thoroughbred auctions.2  For example, 
before being sold, horses are sometimes injected with steroids 
to make their chests appear stronger.3  Agents, hired to bid for 
prospective owners, have been caught defrauding their 
principals by colluding with sellers and accepting undisclosed 
commissions.4  Sellers even use agents to bid on their own 
  
 1 Joe Drape, No Gift Horses Here, So Look in Their Mouths, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
14, 2005, §1, at 1 [hereinafter Drape, No Gift Horses Here] (quoting John Ward, trainer 
of 2001 Kentucky Derby winner, Monarchos). 
 2 For example, sellers are generally not permitted to bid on their own goods 
at public auction.  See U.C.C. § 2-328(4) (1977).  However, the Conditions of Sale at the 
major public thoroughbred auctions all expressly permit owners to bid on their own 
horses to run up the purchase price, a practice known as “bi-bidding.”  See, e.g., 
BARRETTS, JANUARY MIXED SALE 2007, CONDITIONS OF SALE, available at 
http://barretts.com/CATALOG/catjan07/conditon.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2007); 
KEENELAND THOROUGHBRED RACING & SALES, CONDITIONS OF SALE, available at 
http://ww2.keeneland.com/sales/lists/copy/conditions.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).  
For a discussion of the Conditions of Sale at public auctions and their legal 
implications, see infra Part II.B. 
 3 See Drape, No Gift Horses Here, supra note 1; see also infra note 123 
(providing more information on the presale use of anabolic steroids). 
 4 See, e.g., Gussin v. Shockey, 725 F. Supp. 271, 273 (D. Md. 1989); Ryan 
Conley, Leslie Deckard & Dan Liebman, McIngvale Suit Charges Kickbacks to Trainer 
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horses at public auctions, resulting in artificially inflated 
purchase prices.5  As in other competitive markets, “the 
boundary between acceptable sporting behavior and 
unacceptable misrepresentation” at thoroughbred auctions “is 
blurred.”6  Even the term “horse trading” has become 
synonymous with deception.7  To restore public confidence, the 
industry itself needs to establish clear standards of what 
constitutes acceptable thoroughbred auction practices.                  
The Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Association 
(“TOBA”) attempted to do just that in December of 2004, when 
it released the Code of Ethics for Thoroughbred Auctions (“Code 
of Ethics”).8  Founded over forty years ago, TOBA is a non-
profit trade organization “dedicated solely to promoting the 
interests of Thoroughbred owners and breeders.”9  TOBA’s 
Code of Ethics was inspired by a similar code adopted by the 
British Jockey Club10 in the summer of 2004.11  The American 
  
and Agents, BLOODHORSE.COM, Sept. 8, 2006, http://news.bloodhorse.com/viewstory_ 
plain.asp?id=35240; Joe Drape, A Horseman’s Lawsuit Puts Trading Practices in the 
Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2006, at D1 [hereinafter Drape, A Horseman’s Lawsuit] 
(detailing recent lawsuit filed by Jess Jackson, owner of Kendall-Jackson Vineyard 
Estates, alleging that his agents defrauded him in connection with thoroughbred 
purchases). 
 5 See Robert S. Miller, America Singing: The Role of Custom and Usage in 
the Thoroughbred Horse Business, 74 KY. L.J. 781, 788 (1986) (explaining the use of 
“bi-bidding” at public thoroughbred auctions); see also Glenye Cain, Sanan Devotes 
Himself to Task Force, DAILY RACING FORM, Sept. 17, 2004 [hereinafter Cain, Sanan 
Devotes Himself].  
 6 Susan Rogers Finneran, Knowing Silence of Nonentreprenurial 
Information Is Not Sporting, 59 ALB. L. REV. 511, 514 (1996). 
 7 See Drew L. Kershen, Horse-Tradin’: Legal Implications of Livestock 
Auction Bidding Practices, 37 ARK. L. REV. 119, 120 (1983).  When the FBI began 
investigating a particular fraudulent horse transaction, and “someone mentioned the 
case involved cheating and fraud, the FBI’s response was something to the effect of 
‘isn’t that what horse traders do?’”  KC Reynolds, Commission Conundrum Part 3: 
Ethics and Pressure in the Industry . . . Is “Buyer Beware” Becoming a Thing of the 
Past?, EQUINE CHRON., available at http://www.equinechronicle.com/Features/ 
Reynolds/reynoldsCONUNDRUM_pt3.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2007) (quoting equine 
appraiser Dave Johnson, who assisted in the case). 
 8 Press Release, Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Ass’n, Sales Integrity 
Task Force Issues Code of Ethics for Horse Auctions (Dec. 17, 2004), available at 
http://keeneland.com/news/pressdetail.asp?PID=1678. 
 9 Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Ass’n, TOBA Membership, 
http://www.toba.org/membership (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 10 THE JOCKEY CLUB, THE BLOODSTOCK INDUSTRY CODE OF PRACTICE, 
available at http://www.britishhorseracing.com/images/owning_breeding/The_Bloodstock_ 
Industry_Code_of_Practice.pdf [hereinafter THE JOCKEY CLUB, CODE OF PRACTICE] 
(last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 11 Press Release, The Jockey Club, Landmark Code of Practice Published by 
Bloodstock Industry (July 6, 2004), available at http://thehra.org/doc.php?id=28610 
[hereinafter Press Release, The Jockey Club, Landmark Code].  For more information 
on the Jockey Club’s Code of Practice, see infra Part III.  In April of 2006, the Jockey 
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Code, like its British predecessor, aims to minimize deceptive 
auction practices by increasing transparency at thoroughbred 
sales.  
The Code of Ethics articulates required disclosures for 
thoroughbred sales at public auctions.12  It is particularly 
concerned with issues related to bloodstock agents,13 since they 
are so commonly utilized at public auctions, especially by 
novice buyers, who are most in need of veterans’ expertise.  
Under the Code, bloodstock agents must disclose if they are 
representing both the purchaser and the seller in a transaction, 
because “dual agency (without disclosure to all parties) is 
inherently fraudulent.”14  The Code of Ethics also encourages 
full disclosure of owners’ identities, while at the same time 
recognizing owners’ privacy interests.15  A potential purchaser 
may inquire into the identity of a horse’s owner, but if the 
owner’s agent denies this request for information, the potential 
purchaser’s only recourse is to delete this horse from 
consideration.16   
This Note will examine fraudulent thoroughbred 
auction practices, focusing specifically on the barriers to 
enforcing TOBA’s Code of Ethics for Thoroughbred Auctions.  
Part II of this Note will provide an introduction to 
thoroughbred auctions and a short summary of the legal issues 
they implicate, addressing the limited forms of relief available 
to dissatisfied purchasers.  Part III will briefly describe the 
British Jockey Club’s Bloodstock Industry Code of Practice,17 
which served as the model for the American thoroughbred 
  
Club turned over its horse racing regulatory responsibilities to the Horseracing 
Regulatory Authority (“HRA”).  Press releases issued by the Jockey Club are now 
hosted on the HRA’s Web site.  See infra note 68; text accompanying notes 94-99 
(providing further explanation of this transition).   
 12 See THOROUGHBRED OWNERS AND BREEDERS ASS’N, CODE OF ETHICS FOR 
THOROUGHBRED AUCTIONS arts. I & II, http://www.salesintegrity.org/downloads/ 
Code_of_Ethics2.pdf [hereinafter TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS] (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 13 Bloodstock agents act as intermediaries in the purchase or sale of a horse.  
Robert S. Miller, The Sale of Horses and Horse Interests: A Transactional Approach, 78 
KY. L.J. 517, 556 (1989).  They are paid a commission, typically five percent of the sale 
price, as compensation for their success in locating a buyer or seller and negotiating 
the deal.  BLOOD-HORSE PUBL’NS, THE BLOOD-HORSE AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO 
AUCTIONS 69 (2004) [hereinafter AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS].  Bloodstock 
agents are common in thoroughbred sales, where sellers and potential buyers often 
lack the necessary time or experience to effectuate the most successful equine 
transactions.  See infra Part V.A.   
 14 TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 12, art. II. 
 15 Id. art. I. 
 16 Id. 
 17 THE JOCKEY CLUB, CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 10. 
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industry’s Code of Ethics.18  Part IV of this Note will explain the 
various provisions of the American Code of Ethics for 
Thoroughbred Auctions and the industry concerns it reflects.  
Part V will compare enforcement powers under the British and 
American codes, focusing on how the different regulatory 
structures of these countries’ horse racing industries affect the 
enforcement of their respective codes.  This Part will argue that 
the United States’ decentralized regulatory system presents 
greater enforcement problems than those faced in the United 
Kingdom.  Although the Code of Ethics for Thoroughbred 
Auctions is a step in the right direction for the American 
thoroughbred industry, Part VI will argue that the Code of 
Ethics’ drafters failed to give it any real “teeth,”19 rendering its 
provisions little more than discretionary guidelines.  The Code 
is not completely meaningless, however, as Part VI will 
contend, for it brings important issues to the forefront of 
discussion in the industry.  This Note will conclude, however, 
that the American thoroughbred industry has gotten way 
ahead of itself and should consider implementing a centralized 
regulatory body to enforce the Code of Ethics if it truly wants to 
improve auction practices. 
II. THOROUGHBRED AUCTIONS  
A. Introduction 
One of the first major decisions a thoroughbred owner 
must face is where to purchase his first racehorse.  Although 
many racehorses are traded in private transactions or 
purchased at claiming races,20 a large percentage of 
  
 18 TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 12. 
 19 See, e.g., Glenye Cain, Ethics Code Encourages Disclosure, Lacks Teeth, 
DAILY RACING FORM, Dec. 16, 2004 [hereinafter Cain, Ethics Code] (“The code does not 
set forth penalties for infractions or offer specific recourse for aggrieved parties . . . .”); 
Cot Campbell, Integrity No Easy Task, BLOODHORSE.COM, Jan. 12, 2005, 
http://www.bloodhorse.com/articleindex/article.asp?id=26173 (reporting that critics 
have questioned  “Where are the teeth?  No penalties, no disciplinary provisions for 
violating the Code.”); Ray Paulick, Cot To Be Good, BLOODHORSE.COM, Dec. 21, 2004, 
http://www.bloodhorse.com/articleindex/article.asp?id=25891 (“I wish the Sales Integrity 
Task Force had come up with a way to enforce the new code of ethics and penalize 
known violators.”) [hereinafter Paulick, Cot To Be Good]. 
 20 Each horse that runs in a claiming race is available for sale.  Owners enter 
their thoroughbreds into races, designated by the price value of the horse.  Horses 
entered in these races must be sold to any owner who “claims” the horse for its 
designated value before the race is run.  Each state has its own rules about what 
conditions potential owners must meet before they are permitted to submit a claim.  
See The Racing Game, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.theracinggame.com/ 
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thoroughbreds are bought and sold at public auctions each 
year.21  In 2006 alone, thoroughbred buyers spent over one 
billion dollars at public auctions in North America.22  
Purchasing a horse at auction may be a particularly attractive 
option for newcomers, since this forum offers the widest 
selection of horses for sale and “often assure[s] fair market 
value.”23   
Thoroughbred auctions take place all around the United 
States, but the most well-known sales companies are based in 
Kentucky (Keeneland and Fasig-Tipton), Florida (Ocala 
Breeders’ Sales Company), and California (Barretts).24  These 
auctions are typically organized by the horses’ ages and 
intended use.25  For example, Keeneland holds separate 
auctions each year for two-year-olds-in-training, yearlings,26 
breeding stock,27 and a mixed sale with horses of various ages 
and purposes.28  Purchasing a yearling is often the least 
expensive option for a novice owner looking to break into the 
horse racing business.29  However, because these young 
  
lists/faq/allitemsalt.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).  Many new owners choose to 
“claim” their first thoroughbreds because these horses are ready to race almost 
immediately.  Additionally, claiming races provide one of the least expensive ways to 
purchase a racehorse.  THOROUGHBRED OWNERS AND BREEDERS ASS’N, NEW 
THOROUGHBRED OWNERS HANDBOOK: AN ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO THOROUGHBRED 
OWNERSHIP 56 (Laura Proctor ed., 2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter NEW THOROUGHBRED 
OWNERS HANDBOOK].   
 21 In 2006, there were approximately 21,247 thoroughbreds sold at public 
auctions in North America.  This figure includes sales of stallion seasons and stallion 
shares.  THE JOCKEY CLUB (U.S.), Auction Sales in North America, in 2007 ONLINE 
FACT BOOK, http://www.jockeyclub.com/factbook.asp?section=13 (last visited Apr. 20, 
2007).  A stallion season is the right to mate a mare with a specific stallion for one 
breeding season, while a stallion share is a proprietary interest in a specific stallion 
that gives the owner the right to breed a mare with that stallion every breeding season.  
AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 103. 
 22 THE JOCKEY CLUB (U.S.), supra note 21.  The exact figure of 
$1,266,684,292 includes sales of stallion seasons and stallion shares.  Id.  For an 
explanation of stallion seasons and stallion shares, see supra note 21. 
 23 NEW THOROUGHBRED OWNERS HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 61. 
 24 AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 19. 
 25 NEW THOROUGHBRED OWNERS HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 61. 
 26 A thoroughbred’s official “birthday” is January 1 of the year it was born.  
Once a horse enters its second calendar year, it is considered a “yearling,” regardless of 
when the horse was actually born.  See id. at 70.  Therefore, a two-year-old 
thoroughbred is one that has entered its third calendar year. 
 27 As the name implies, horses sold at “breeding stock” auctions are primarily 
intended for breeding purposes, rather than racing.  See AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO 
AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 15. 
 28 Keeneland Thoroughbred Racing & Sales, Sales Calendar, 
http://ww2.keeneland.com/sales/Events/calendar.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2007) 
(listing Keeneland’s upcoming thoroughbred auctions). 
 29 See NEW THOROUGHBRED OWNERS HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 68. 
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thoroughbreds are entirely unproven, with no racing 
experience or training, investing in a yearling is also the 
biggest gamble for a new owner.30  For some owners, this 
gamble pays off.  Funny Cide, winner of the 2003 Kentucky 
Derby and Preakness Stakes, was purchased as a yearling for 
just $22,000.31  Of course, for every Funny Cide, there are 
countless yearlings destined for the anonymity of “also rans.”  
For this reason, many new buyers choose to bid on more 
established thoroughbreds at the two-year-olds-in-training 
auctions or mixed sales. 
Before arriving at the auction, potential purchasers are 
encouraged to thoroughly review the auction’s sales catalog.  
The sales catalog lists information about all of the horses for 
sale, including their pedigrees and hip numbers.32  Most 
importantly, the sales catalog contains the auction’s Conditions 
of Sale, which lists the contractual terms governing all sales at 
the auction.33  Most potential owners narrow down the field of 
available horses with the assistance of a bloodstock agent, who 
also bids on their behalf.34  Bloodstock agents may be especially 
valuable to new owners, who often lack the knowledge and 
personal experience necessary to select the most promising 
horses.   
The horses’ medical records are usually available for 
viewing in the auction’s repository.35  Some sales companies 
restrict access to the repository to medical professionals, so 
potential owners are encouraged to hire an equine veterinarian 
to review the medical records and provide insight into the 
horses’ health and fitness.36  This veterinarian should also 
physically examine a horse before his client bids on it, looking 
for any potential problem areas.37  Auction participants and 
their agents should investigate the horses as much as possible 
  
 30 Id. at 68, 70. 
 31 AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 74. 
 32 Every horse for sale at an auction is identified by a number affixed to its 
hip.  This “hip number” also reflects the order in which the horse will be brought into 
the auction ring.  Id. at 101. 
 33 The Conditions of Sale are discussed in greater detail infra Part II.B. 
 34 For more information about bloodstock agents and the legal issues they 
present, see infra Part V.A. 
 35 AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 54-55.  Sellers have 
the option of whether or not to submit medical records to the repository, so x-rays and 
other information may not be available for every horse being sold at the auction.  See 
id. at 55.   
 36 Id. at 95; NEW THOROUGHBRED OWNERS HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 31. 
 37 AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 70-71. 
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before purchasing, because once the hammer falls, a 
dissatisfied buyer has very limited remedies.   
B. Legal Implications 
Horses are considered “goods” under the Uniform 
Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”), so thoroughbred transactions fall 
under the governance of Article 2 of the U.C.C.38  Sale by 
auction is also covered by the U.C.C.,39 but state auction laws 
supplement its provisions.40  If a buyer feels he has been 
“duped” in his purchase of a thoroughbred, the U.C.C. offers 
him two forms of relief.41  The buyer may attempt to rescind his 
purchase by rejecting the horse or revoking his acceptance.42  
He can also sue for damages based on breach of warranty.43 
Most purchasers in this situation choose to rescind the 
purchase rather than sue for damages.44  A dissatisfied buyer 
would not want to keep and maintain a horse that is unfit for 
racing or breeding due to some undisclosed defect.  If a buyer 
purchases a thoroughbred for breeding purposes and then 
discovers that, despite representations to the contrary, the 
horse is castrated, the buyer is unlikely to keep the animal 
because it is no longer of any value to him.45  It would be more 
  
 38 N. Ridge Farms, Inc. v. Trimble, No. 82-CA-1305-MR, 1983 Ky. App. 
LEXIS 364, at *9 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 1983); Anne I. Bandes, Saddled with a Lame 
Horse? Why State Consumer Protection Laws Can Be the Best Protection for Duped 
Horse Purchasers, 44 B.C. L. REV. 789, 792 (2003); John Alan Cohan, The Uniform 
Commercial Code as Applied to Implied Warranties of “Merchantability” and “Fitness” 
in the Sale of Horses, 73 KY. L.J. 665, 666-67 (1985); John J. Kropp, J. Jeffrey Landen 
& Daniel C. Heyd, Horse Sense and the UCC: The Purchase of Racehorses, 1 MARQ. 
SPORTS L.J. 171, 174 (1991); Cary Robertson, Thoroughbred Certificate Law: A 
Proposal, 78 KY. L.J. 659, 672 (1990). 
 39 U.C.C. § 2-328 (1998). 
 40 Kropp, Landen & Heyd, supra note 38, at 177-78.  “[U]nless displaced by 
the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law 
merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, 
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or 
invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.”  Id. at 178 n.36 (quoting U.C.C. § 
1-103 (1972)). 
 41 Bandes, supra note 38, at 795. 
 42 Id. 
 43 The purchaser may seek damages in the amount of the difference between 
what he paid for the horse and what the horse would have been worth if it had been as 
warranted, unless special circumstances exist which lead to a different amount of 
damages.  Id. at 802 (citing U.C.C. § 2-714(2)).   
 44 Id. at 795 (citing Miller, supra note 13, at 547).   
 45 See Brodsky v. Nerud, 414 N.Y.S.2d 38, 40 (App. Div. 1979).  In Brodsky v. 
Nerud, a castrated horse was incorrectly listed as a colt in the program at a claiming 
race.  The buyer only discovered the horse was castrated once he took it home.  Because 
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appropriate for this particular buyer to rescind the purchase by 
rejecting the horse or revoking acceptance.  A buyer’s ability to 
rescind his thoroughbred purchase is severely limited, 
however, as most public auctions disclaim warranties as part of 
their Conditions of Sale.46  An auction’s Conditions of Sale, 
usually printed in the sales catalog, include the contract terms 
for all horses being sold at that auction.47  The buyer, seller, 
and sales company are all bound to these terms.48 
As a general rule, a horse is sold “as is” at a public 
auction.49  Of course, there are exceptions.  Certain physical 
conditions,50 which are expressly named in an auction’s 
catalog,51 must be announced to potential purchasers before 
  
he purchased the horse for breeding, it was “useless to him.”  Id.  For an explanation of 
claiming races, see supra note 20. 
 46 See Cohen v. N. Ridge Farms, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1265 (E.D. Ky. 1989).  In 
this case, a buyer at the Keeneland auction brought an action against the seller and 
auctioneer to rescind his purchase of a colt because he later discovered that the horse 
suffered from a displaced soft palate, a condition that could affect its racing ability.  
The buyer’s claim for rescission failed because the Conditions of Sale, as documented in 
the auction catalog, expressly disclaimed all warranties.  Id. at 1269.  The Conditions 
of Sale read in part: “THERE IS NO WARRANTY IMPLIED BY AUCTIONEER OR 
CONSIGNOR, EXCEPT AS SET FORTH HEREIN, AS TO THE MERCHANTABILITY 
OR FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE OF ANY ANIMAL OFFERED IN 
THIS SALE, ALL SALES ARE MADE ON AN AS IS BASIS, WITH ALL FAULTS.”  Id. 
at 1267; see also Keeneland Ass’n, Inc. v. Eamer, 830 F. Supp. 974, 986 (E.D. Ky. 1993) 
(finding that Keeneland’s use of disclaimers waiving all warranties was proper and 
enforceable, so buyer could not rescind his purchase after discovering the horse 
suffered from leg problems).  See generally U.C.C. § 2-316 (1998) (dealing with 
exclusion of warranties).  Even a contract that excludes all warranties may still be 
enforceable.  See Greg Coats Cars, Inc. v. Kasey, 576 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1978). 
 47 Bandes, supra note 38, at 794. 
 48 AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 44-45. 
 49 Id. at 47.   
 50 Cribbing, wobbler syndrome, and eye defects are among the conditions that 
must be disclosed to potential buyers under the Conditions of Sale.  Id.  A “cribber” is a 
horse that digs its teeth into an object (often a fence), arches its neck, and then sucks 
air into its stomach.  Cribbing is considered a controllable behavior, not a disease.  
NEW THOROUGHBRED OWNERS HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 204.  Wobbler syndrome is 
“a neurological disease associated with incoordination and weakness.”  Id. at 211.  In 
order to rescind his purchase of an undisclosed “cribber” or “wobbler,” a buyer must be 
able to prove that the behavior or condition existed at the time of sale.  This can be 
quite difficult to prove.  See, e.g., Keeneland, 830 F. Supp. at 988.  The buyer in 
Keeneland was unable to rescind his purchase of an allegedly undisclosed cribber 
because he could not prove that the horse was a cribber at the time of purchase.  
Eamer, the purchaser, produced no evidence that this particular horse exhibited 
cribbing behavior prior to the sale, and a veterinarian explained in an affidavit that 
horses do not typically develop cribbing behavior until they are over one year old.  This 
horse was only seven months old when Eamer purchased it.  Id. 
 51 The auction catalog contains information about the horses that are for sale 
and also lists the Conditions of Sale.  It is usually available weeks before the auction so 
that prospective bidders can familiarize themselves with the process and plan on which 
thoroughbreds to bid.  See Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Ass’n, Before the 
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bidding begins or must otherwise be disclosed by veterinary 
certificates on file in the auction’s repository.52  Under the 
Conditions of Sale at public thoroughbred auctions, potential 
buyers have a duty to review a horse’s veterinary certificates, 
x-rays, and any other medical information that is on file in the 
repository before deciding whether to buy the animal.53    
Buyers are also encouraged to physically examine the 
thoroughbreds themselves and hire veterinarians to examine 
the horses prior to purchase.54  Although the Conditions of Sale 
do not require these physical examinations, a buyer cannot 
rescind his thoroughbred purchase if he later discovers a defect 
in the horse that he would have discovered at the auction if he 
had conducted the customary examination.55  However, if an 
owner later discovers that the horse he purchased at a public 
auction suffers from one of the conditions that fall under the 
exceptions to the warranty disclaimer, and this condition was 
not disclosed at the auction, he may attempt to rescind the 
purchase based on breach of warranty.56  A purchaser’s ability 
to rescind is further restricted, however, as he must notify the 
sales company in writing within the limited “right to return” 
time frame recorded in the auction’s Conditions of Sale.57  Sales 
companies give the buyer a very limited amount of time to 
rescind his purchase, often just forty-eight hours after the 
auction ends,58 because a horse’s physical condition is subject to 
change very quickly.59    
  
Auction: Preliminary Work, http://www.toba.org/owner-education/before-the-auction.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 52 AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 47. 
 53 Id. at 54. 
 54 See, e.g., BARRETTS, supra note 2 (“Buyer acknowledges that he/she has 
had the opportunity to inspect and examine, by veterinarian or otherwise, each horse 
he/she has purchased and accepts any horse he/she purchases with all conditions and 
defects except those which are specifically warranted in these Conditions.”); 
KEENELAND THOROUGHBRED RACING & SALES, supra note 2 (“All prospective buyers 
are urged to carefully examine horses in which they may be interested personally 
and/or by agents or veterinarians of their choosing BEFORE bidding as they are 
accepting any horse purchased with all faults, including all conditions and defects, 
except for applicable limited warranties . . . .”). 
 55 See Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 400 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(holding that a buyer could not rescind his purchase of a horse because he passed up 
the “reasonable opportunity to inspect it” before purchasing, so his rejection was 
therefore not effectuated in a reasonable time); see also U.C.C. § 2-602 (1998); Cohan, 
supra note 38, at 685. 
 56 AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 47. 
 57 Id. 
 58 See KEENELAND THOROUGHBRED RACING & SALES, supra note 2. 
 59 See id. 
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In some situations, a purchaser may even be able to 
rescind a sale based on an undisclosed defect that does not fall 
under the exceptions to the auction’s warranty disclaimers.60  
In Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Ass’n, Inc., the plaintiff 
successfully rescinded his purchase of a thoroughbred after 
discovering the horse had a heart murmur which precluded it 
from safely carrying a rider.61  Although the auction’s 
Conditions of Sale had a clear disclaimer waiving warranties, 
this blanket waiver did not waive the seller’s express 
warranties because he made an affirmative, material 
misrepresentation about the horse.  The court held that the 
defendant’s statement to the purchaser that the thoroughbred 
was “healthy and fit for racing and breeding purposes” was an 
express warranty.62  As such, the catalog’s waiver of warranties 
could not disclaim the seller’s express warranty about the 
horse’s condition.63 
Courts may consider thoroughbred industry customs 
when interpreting a sales contract.64   Individuals who are new 
to horse racing, however, cannot be bound by industry customs 
unless they knew of these customs or the customs were so 
widespread and well-known that newcomers are presumed to 
be aware of their existence.65  Trade codes like TOBA’s Code of 
Ethics can assist courts in interpreting industry contracts66 by 
helping to establish the existence of a specific custom.   
  
 60 If the seller has made affirmative, material representations about the 
horse, his statements will constitute an express warranty, which cannot be waived by a 
general disclaimer waiving all warranties.  Travis v. Wash. Horse Breeders Ass’n, Inc., 
759 P.2d 418, 422 (Wash. 1988). 
 61 Id. at 419-20. 
 62 Id. at 422. 
 63 Id. at 421-22.   
 64 See U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (2004) (defining usage of trade as “any practice or 
method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as 
to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in 
question”); see also Kropp, Landen & Heyd, supra note 38, at 183.  For a detailed 
account of the role of trade customs in the thoroughbred industry, see Miller, supra 
note 5. 
 65 Miller, supra note 5, at 812.    
 66 See U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (2004) (showing that a written trade code can help 
prove the existence of a usage of trade, but the court has the power to interpret the 
provisions of the writing). 
2007] PUTTING THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE 1071 
III. THE UNITED KINGDOM RESPONDS TO THOROUGHBRED 
SALES FRAUD: THE BLOODSTOCK INDUSTRY CODE OF 
PRACTICE 
From 1752 to April of 2006, horse racing conduct in the 
United Kingdom was regulated by the Jockey Club, an 
organization which also owned and operated thirteen 
racetracks.67  The Jockey Club’s power as British horse racing’s 
regulatory authority gave the organization a great deal of 
control over the conduct of racing participants.68  All jockeys 
and trainers who worked in the United Kingdom were required 
to be licensed by the Jockey Club, and all owners of racehorses 
had to be registered with the Club.69  As a result, these groups 
were bound by the Club’s Rules of Racing.70 
The British Jockey Club proposed its Bloodstock71 
Industry Code of Practice72 on July 6, 2004,73 in response to a 
highly publicized case74 involving agent bribery.  In this case, 
  
 67 The Jockey Club, History and Background, http://www.thejockeyclub.co.uk/ 
doc.php?id=41557 (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 68 See Horseracing Regulatory Authority, Powers of the HRA, 
http://thehra.org/doc.php?id=9 (last visited Apr. 20, 2007) (explaining the HRA’s 
regulatory powers, powers that were previously held by the Jockey Club) [hereinafter 
Powers of the HRA].  As explained infra text accompanying notes 94-99, the Jockey 
Club is no longer the regulatory authority for British horse racing.  The Horseracing 
Regulatory Authority (“HRA”) assumed this responsibility in April of 2006.  The Jockey 
Club thereafter removed from its Web site all information relating to its previous 
responsibilities.  Printouts from earlier versions of the Jockey Club Web site are on file 
with the Brooklyn Law Review.  All of the regulatory and disciplinary information once 
maintained on the Jockey Club’s Web site is now located on the HRA’s Web site.  
Therefore, information about duties and powers once held by the Jockey Club, but now 
maintained by the HRA, is referenced to the HRA’s Web site.   
 69 See id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 The term “bloodstock” describes thoroughbreds that are “bred for racing.”  
Equisearch.com, Glossary of Equine Terms, http://equisearch.com/advice/glossary/ 
glossaryB (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 72 THE JOCKEY CLUB, CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 10. 
 73 See Press Release, The Jockey Club, Landmark Code, supra note 11. 
 74 The original dispute in this lawsuit was not about a bloodstock agent’s 
undisclosed profits.  The lawsuit dealt with which party in a thoroughbred transaction 
should bear the costs when the horse was injured shortly after a verbal agreement of 
sale.  Young thoroughbred Foodbroker Fancy was injured a few days after the parties 
agreed to the sale and the deal subsequently fell through.  The filly was eventually sold 
to another party and this case dealt with who should be held responsible for paying 
Foodbroker Fancy’s veterinary bills from the time that the original sale fell through to 
the time when the horse was sold to the third party.  Details of the undisclosed 
“sweetener” emerged at trial, leading to strong criticism from the presiding judge and, 
ultimately, a settlement.  Richard Evans, Horsetrading Scandal Puts Sport of Kings 
Back in Dock, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 27, 2004, Sport, at 4 [hereinafter 
Evans, Horsetrading Scandal]. 
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leading thoroughbred trainer David Elsworth was offered a 
£10,000 “sweetener” by one of Britain’s most successful 
bloodstock agents, Charlie Gordon-Watson, to ensure that 
promising filly Foodbroker Fancy would be sold to an American 
client.75  The filly’s owners, Foodbrokers Ltd., were already 
paying Elsworth a five percent commission76 and were unaware 
that the trainer would also receive this additional £10,000 in 
connection with the sale.77 
Judge Michael Dean Q.C. of Central London County 
Court criticized this practice of bloodstock agents accepting 
undisclosed “sweeteners.”78  Calling these secret commissions 
“quite illegal,” Judge Dean urged the bloodstock industry to 
stop this practice.79  Despite the accusations of impropriety, 
Gordon-Watson maintained that the additional £10,000 was 
simply compensation for the loss of training fees that Elsworth 
would have accrued had the filly not been sold.80  The 
bloodstock agent further claimed that such payment is 
customary in thoroughbred transactions.81  Even though 
Gordon-Watson denied any wrongdoing, the parties eventually 
settled the claim, with Gordon-Watson paying a total of 
£50,000 in damages and costs to the aggrieved parties.82 
Due to the involvement of such high-profile players in 
the thoroughbred industry,83 this scandal caught the attention 
of the British media.  London’s Daily Telegraph conducted an 
investigation into these horse transactions, speaking with 
many industry insiders to determine exactly how prevalent this 
  
 75 Richard Evans, Jockey Club Probe Bloodstock ‘Fraud,’ DAILY TELEGRAPH 
(London), Jan. 27, 2004, Sport, at 1 [hereinafter Evans, Jockey Club Probe].  Gordon-
Watson was working as an agent for Richard Duggan, a California agent who wanted 
to acquire Foodbroker Fancy for his own American principal.  Ray Paulick, Ethics 
Update, BLOODHORSE.COM, June 17, 2004, http://www.bloodhorse.com/articleindex/ 
article.asp?id=23015 [hereinafter Paulick, Ethics Update]. 
 76 Trainers often serve as agents in horse transactions, and are themselves 
paid the customary five percent commission.  Miller, supra note 5, at 781. 
 77 Evans, Jockey Club Probe, supra note 75. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See Evans, Horsetrading Scandal, supra note 74. 
 80 Id.  
 81 Paulick, Ethics Update, supra note 75. 
 82 Gordon-Watson paid £40,000 in costs and fees to Foodbrokers Ltd. and 
£10,000 to Richard Duggan, his American principal.  Evans, Jockey Club Probe, supra 
note 75; Paulick, Ethics Update, supra note 75. 
 83 Gordon-Watson purchased the 2003 Epsom Derby winner as a yearling, 
and David Elsworth trained a Cheltenham Gold Cup winner.  Evans, Horsetrading 
Scandal, supra note 74; Evans, Jockey Club Probe, supra note 75.   
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kind of deception is in the world of racehorse sales.84  The 
newspaper concluded that not only are these fraudulent sales 
practices widespread within the racing world,85 but this 
behavior is accepted as a customary trait of the industry.86  
Shortly after newspaper reports exposed the industry’s “dirty 
little secret,” the Jockey Club announced a summit of various 
horse racing organizations and the Federation of Bloodstock 
Agents to discuss ways “to increase transparency in sales 
transactions.”87  The parties ultimately concluded that 
developing a code of practice governing these sales would be 
the necessary first step in this process.88    
Following this recommendation, the Club published its 
Bloodstock Industry Code of Practice in July of 2004.89   An 
agent’s duty of loyalty was central to its focus.  The Code of 
Practice states that an agent should not place himself in a 
position where his personal interests might conflict with his 
duty to his principal, and an “[a]gent shall not use his position 
to obtain a secret profit.”90  It also requires an agent to disclose 
if he is working for more than one principal in a transaction.91  
If a vendor offers an agent “Luck Money,”92 the Code of Practice 
  
 84 See, e.g., Richard Evans, Foodbroker Case Is Just “Tip of Rotten Iceberg”: A 
Lawyer Specialising in Racing Says that Some Cases Amount to Nothing but Theft, 
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 27, 2004, Sport, at 5 [hereinafter Evans, Foodbroker 
Case]; Evans, Horsetrading Scandal, supra note 74; Evans, Jockey Club Probe, supra 
note 75. 
 85 A similar case of agent impropriety occurred in 1999, when trainers Paul 
Webber and Oliver Sherwood were accused of colluding to run up the price of a horse 
that was purchased for Webber’s principal.  A British court found that the parties were 
guilty of fraud and awarded the principal £51,480 in damages.  See Exterior Profiles, 
Ltd. v. Curragh Bloodstock Agency, Ltd., 1999 WL 1611280 (Q.B.D. Nov. 12, 1999); see 
also Marcus Armytage, Sherwood and Webber Fined, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 
10, 2000, available at http://telegraph.co.uk/htmlContent.jhtml?html=/archive/2000/ 
03/10/soarmy10.html. 
 86 Evans, Horsetrading Scandal, supra note 74 (noting that some fraudulent 
practices are “not regarded as anything untoward” by many British horsemen). 
 87 Richard Evans, Jockey Club Call Summit on Corruption, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 28, 2004, Sport, at 1 [hereinafter Evans, Jockey Club Call 
Summit].   
 88 Press Release, The Jockey Club, Working Group Established to Develop 
Bloodtsock [sic] Industry Code of Practice (Apr. 1, 2004), available at 
http://thehra.org/doc.php?id=28614 [hereinafter Press Release, The Jockey Club, 
Working Group Established]. 
 89 Press Release, The Jockey Club, Landmark Code, supra note 11. 
 90 THE JOCKEY CLUB, CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 10, § 2. 
 91 Id. § 4. 
 92 The Code of Practice defines “Luck Money” as “any financial payment or 
payment in kind made by or on behalf of a vendor to a Purchaser or his Agent, after the 
sale of a horse has been concluded.”  Id. § 6. 
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requires the agent to report this to his principal and possibly 
account for this money.93    
On April 3, 2006, the Jockey Club transferred its 
regulatory responsibilities to the Horseracing Regulatory 
Authority (“HRA”).94  The goal was to separate the Jockey 
Club’s commercial activity from its regulatory, licensing, and 
disciplinary responsibilities.95  The HRA is not entirely 
autonomous, however.96  Most of its employees worked for the 
Jockey Club up until the switch, and the HRA is now 
technically a division of the Club.97  The Jockey Club maintains 
that this is just a temporary arrangement, necessary until 
disputes over transferring pension entitlements are resolved.98  
The United Kingdom aims to have a truly “independent, 
professional system of regulation”99 once these disputes are 
resolved and the HRA is able to split from the Jockey Club.   
As the central regulatory body for British horse racing 
conduct,100 the HRA is now responsible for enforcing the Code of 
Practice.101  Complainants must report alleged breaches of the 
Code of Practice to the HRA.102  If the Authority considers the 
  
 93 Id. 
 94 Press Release, Horseracing Regulatory Authority, An Historic Day for 
Racing—The HRA Assumes Regulatory Control (Apr. 3, 2006), available at 
http://thehra.org/doc.php?id=40796. 
 95 Marcus Armytage, HRA Takes Reins from Jockey Club, DAILY TELEGRAPH 
(London), Apr. 3, 2006, Sport, at 29.  
 96 Id. 
 97 Greg Wood, End of Era as Jockey Club Falls on Own Sword, GUARDIAN 
(London), Apr. 3, 2006, Sport, at 17. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Horse Racing: High Stakes, GUARDIAN (London), July 8, 2006, Leader, at 
30. 
 100 The HRA is responsible for regulating horse racing conduct, but the British 
Horseracing Board (“BHB”) is the governing body for British horse racing.  See British 
Horseracing Board, What We Do, http://www.britishhorseracing.com/inside_horseracing/ 
about/whatwedo/default.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).  They are not affiliated with 
the British government, though the BHB “lead[s] the industry in dealings with the 
Government.”  British Horseracing Board, What We Do: Government Liaison, 
http://www.britishhorseracing.com/inside_horseracing/about/whatwedo/government.asp 
(last visited Apr. 20, 2007).  There are reports that the HRA and the BHB will 
eventually be merged into one governance/regulation body, the British Horseracing 
Authority (“BHA”).  See, e.g., The Jockey Club, History and Background, supra note 67; 
Press Release, Horseracing Regulatory Authority, Nic Coward Assumes  Responsibility 
at the HRA (Feb. 22, 2007), available at http://www.thehra.org/doc.php?id=44530. 
 101 E-mail from Owen Byrne, Public Relations Officer, Horseracing Regulatory 
Authority, to author (Nov. 9, 2006) (on file with the Brooklyn Law Review). 
 102 THE JOCKEY CLUB, CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 10, § 9.  The HRA 
emphasizes the importance of individuals with information reporting alleged breaches 
of the Code of Practice, and then supplying the Authority with the evidence necessary 
to support their allegations.  See E-mail from Owen Byrne, supra note 101 (explaining 
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violation to be “contrary to the integrity, proper conduct or good 
reputation of horse racing,” the HRA reserves the right to ban 
the violator from all British racecourses and any other premise 
that the HRA licenses.103  Additionally, if the violator is licensed 
or registered with the HRA, it has the power to suspend, 
withdraw, or not renew his license.104  The Authority can 
declare a licensed individual to be a “disqualified person,” 
which “prevent[s] the individual from entering any racecourse 
or being employed in a training yard,” and it can also fine 
licensed individuals up to £40,000 for violations.105  Since the 
HRA assumed regulation responsibilities, it has investigated 
several allegations of Code of Practice violations, but none of 
these complaints have resulted in disciplinary action.106 
IV. THE UNITED STATES FOLLOWS THE UNITED KINGDOM’S 
LEAD: THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR THOROUGHBRED 
AUCTIONS 
Fraud in thoroughbred sales was also a problem across 
the Atlantic.  After the Jockey Club released its Code of 
Practice, one of the United States’ most prominent 
thoroughbred owners, Satish Sanan,107 called upon the 
American industry to adopt a similar code of ethics for 
bloodhorse sales.108  Sanan stressed the need for a code that 
would extend beyond the United Kingdom’s Code of Practice, 
including requiring disclosure of any surgeries a horse had 
undergone to correct conformation109 defects and disclosure of 
all medications a horse had taken.110    
  
that such voluntary reporting is necessary because “[w]ith the bloodstock world as it is, 
much is done by word of mouth rather than being committed to paper, and only 
microphones on all agents, vendors and trainers or an HRA employee stood at every 
stable door could enable [the HRA] to pro-actively police [sales],” and the HRA lacks 
“the resources or inclination to police the sales in such a manner”). 
 103 THE JOCKEY CLUB, CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 10, § 9. 
 104 See Powers of the HRA, supra note 68. 
 105 Id. 
 106 E-mail from Owen Byrne, supra note 101. 
 107 Satish Sanan is one of the world’s top purchasers of yearlings at auction.  
See Glenye Cain, Signs Point to Sanan Attending Keeneland Sale, DAILY RACING FORM, 
Aug. 20, 2004 [hereinafter Cain, Signs Point to Sanan]. 
 108 Glenye Cain, Sanan Calls for Reforms on Sales of Thoroughbreds, DAILY 
RACING FORM, July 3, 2004, available at http://espn.go.com/horse/news/2004/ 
0703/1833924.html [hereinafter Cain, Sanan Calls for Reforms]. 
 109 Conformation is the “overall physical appearance of a horse, reflecting the 
arrangement of muscle, bone, and other body tissues.”  UC DAVIS SCH. OF VETERINARY 
MED., BOOK OF HORSES: A COMPLETE MEDICAL REFERENCE GUIDE FOR HORSES AND 
FOALS (Mordecai Siegal ed., 1996), reprinted in TheHorse.com, Glossary of Horse 
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The Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Association, 
whose mission is “to improve the economics, integrity and 
pleasure of the sport on behalf of owners and breeders,”111 
responded to Sanan’s pressure by creating the Sales Integrity 
Task Force112 to investigate auction practices and recommend 
ways to improve buyer confidence.113  The Task Force concluded 
its investigation in December 2004.114  Its recommendations 
included a new code of ethics and the use of two disclosure 
forms—a contract for bloodstock agents and a form disclosing 
surgical procedures undergone by a horse.115  Unveiled by 
TOBA that same month, the Code of Ethics for Thoroughbred 
Auctions was originally divided into four articles: “Veterinary 
Practices,” “Disclosure of Ownership,” “The Role of the Agent,” 
and “The Sale Company.”116    
Article I of the Code addressed disclosure of medical 
procedures performed on thoroughbreds.  It categorized some 
medical procedures as “acceptable, but must be disclosed,”117 
  
Health Terms, http://www.thehorse.com/Glossary.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2007); see 
also NEW THOROUGHBRED OWNERS HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 89-96 (explaining 
how to examine a horse’s conformation). 
 110 See Cain, Sanan Calls for Reforms, supra note 108. 
 111 Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Association Home Page, 
http://www.toba.org (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 112 The Task Force was composed of twenty-two leading thoroughbred owners, 
breeders, auction representatives, bloodstock agents, and trainers.  They were divided 
into subcommittees on dual agency, veterinary practices, and full disclosure.  See 
Glenye Cain, Breeders Take Floor in Ethics Debate, DAILY RACING FORM, Oct. 15, 2004 
[hereinafter Cain, Breeders Take Floor]; Sales Integrity Program, Member List, 
http://www.salesintegrity.org/memberlist.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).  Sanan 
served as an owner representative on the Sales Integrity Task Force.  Cain, Sanan 
Devotes Himself, supra note 5. 
 113 See Sales Integrity Task Force, Mission, http://www.salesintegrity.org/ 
code.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 114 Letter from the Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Association to 
Thoroughbred Auction Participants as Part of the Sales Integrity Program (on file with 
the Brooklyn Law Review). 
 115 Id. 
 116 THOROUGHBRED OWNERS AND BREEDERS ASS’N, CODE OF ETHICS FOR 
THOROUGHBRED AUCTIONS (original version), available at http://www.bloodhorse.com/ 
PDF/CodeOfEthics.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2007) [hereinafter TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS 
(original version)]. 
 117 The original Code of Ethics required disclosure of the following procedures:  
Invasive joint surgeries and other surgeries designed to affect permanent 
changes in a horse’s conformation.  These include transphyseal bridges and 
periosteal transsections, manipulations, and elevations.  These are 
procedures adjudged to improve conformation of horses and thus enhance 
their opportunity to remain sound under the rigors of training and racing. 
The fact of them having been performed must be disclosed to all potential 
buyers and buying agents. 
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while banning the use of other “prohibited, unacceptable 
practices.”118  For example, procedures that permanently altered 
a horse’s conformation, such as invasive joint surgeries, were 
deemed acceptable, but the Code required that these 
procedures be disclosed at the sale.119  Procedures that altered a 
horse’s conformation in order to temporarily mask defects for 
the time necessary to complete the sale were labeled 
“unacceptable.”120  The Code forbids sellers from performing 
these temporary procedures after the horse has arrived at the 
sale grounds.121  Additionally, injecting internal blisters122 to 
temporarily alter a horse’s conformation is prohibited within 
ninety days of the sale.  Lastly, the repeated use of anabolic 
steroids to artificially alter a horse’s appearance123 was overall 
“discouraged.”124   
  
Id. art. I. 
 118 Article I of the original Code maintained that a purchaser would be 
entitled to full reimbursement if, within fourteen days after the sale, he could establish 
that the horse he purchased had undergone any of these prohibited practices: 
Temporary alterations which may regress and therefore mask a horse’s true 
conformation or condition, for purposes of sale.  These include shock wave 
therapy, and acupuncture and/or electro-stimulation with the intent of 
altering laryngeal function.  Neither is permissible after a horse has arrived 
at the sale grounds.  Prohibited any time, regardless of the animal’s location, 
within 90 days of sale is the injection of an internal blister or any other 
substance designed to alter conformation temporarily. 
Id. 
 119 Id.  Occasionally, these hidden procedures actually benefit the purchaser.  
In 1996, trainer Bob Baffert bought a colt on behalf of his friend for $17,000 (a 
“bargain-basement price”).  Drape, No Gift Horses Here, supra note 1.  They later 
discovered the colt had undergone a transphyseal bridge to straighten its knee (a 
procedure which the original version of the Code categorized as “acceptable, but must 
be disclosed,” see TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS (original version), supra note 116, art. I).  
Two years later, that horse (Real Quiet) won the Kentucky Derby and the Preakness 
Stakes, missing the Triple Crown “by a nose” at the Belmont Stakes.  Drape, No Gift 
Horses Here, supra note 1. 
 120 TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS (original version), supra note 116, art. I. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Blistering is a procedure used to increase blood circulation in a horse’s 
legs.  It can be done externally by applying a caustic agent to the horse’s skin.  
However, the caustic agent can also be injected beneath the horse’s skin, increasing 
blood flow to the affected area.  NEW THOROUGHBRED OWNERS HANDBOOK, supra note 
20, at 107.  These injections are the “internal blisters” that the original version of the 
Code outlawed within ninety days of sale.  TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS (original version), 
supra note 116, art. I. 
 123 TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS (original version), supra note 116, art. I.  Anabolic 
steroids should be distinguished from corticosteroids, which are prescribed for 
legitimate medical purposes, such as treating inflammation.  In contrast, anabolic 
steroids are primarily used “to keep horses eating and training aggressively” or “to 
replace hormones lost in male horses after being castrated.”  Racing Medication and 
Testing Consortium, Inc., Questions, http://www.rmtcnet.com/content.asp? 
whatpage=QUESTIONS (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).  In most other countries, anabolic 
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Article II of the Code of Ethics, which discussed 
disclosure of a thoroughbred’s owner, proved most contentious 
for the Task Force members.  An agent often bids or places 
horses for sale on behalf of an unidentified principal, with the 
agent’s name documented as the purchaser or seller125 and the 
“true owner” remaining anonymous.  Owners may have 
legitimate reasons for seeking this anonymity.  For example, 
wealthy business executives might not want their purchase 
history accessible to their clients.126  Purchaser and seller 
anonymity is respected at other kinds of auctions, like art 
auctions,127 so proponents of owner privacy feel the 
thoroughbred world should be treated no differently.128   
Despite these justifications, many industry members, 
like Satish Sanan, persistently lobbied for full disclosure of 
horse ownership.129  They argued that anonymity makes it 
easier for an owner to conceal arguably unethical activity, such 
as bidding on one’s own horse to run up the price.130  When 
drafting the Code, the Task Force balanced owners’ privacy 
  
steroids are banned on race day.  However, in most of the United States (all states 
except Iowa), anabolic steroids are permitted for “therapeutic” use at both races and 
sales.  Pete Denk, Keeneland, Fasig-Tipton Form Committee to Address Steroids at 
Sales, THOROUGHBREDTIMES.COM, Jan. 19, 2007, http://www.thoroughbredtimes.com/ 
sales-news/2007/January/19/Keeneland-Fasig-Tipton-form-committee-to-address-
steroids-at-sales.aspx; Bill Finley, Horseracing Officials Move Toward Steroid Ban, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2007, at D1.  Use of anabolic steroids can significantly impact a 
horse’s appearance.  Leading trainer John Ward once purchased promising yearlings at 
auction, only to find them “shriveled up like raisins” shortly thereafter, due to the 
presale use of steroids.  These horses, and others treated with anabolic steroids before 
being sold, gradually returned to their “normal state,” “[b]ut their appearance was 
overrepresented when they went through the sales ring.”  Drape, No Gift Horses Here, 
supra note 1 (quoting John Ward).  See infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text for 
information about the movement to ban the use of anabolic steroids in horse racing and 
sales. 
 124 TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS (original version), supra note 116, art. I. 
 125 See Glenye Cain, Question Remains Whether to Disclose Buyers, DAILY 
RACING FORM, Sept. 16, 2004 [hereinafter Cain, Question Remains].  At the Keeneland 
auction in September of 2004, a Japanese trainer/bloodstock agent purchased a colt for 
$8 million on behalf of a client he declined to identify.  Even Keeneland’s director of 
sales was unaware of the buyer’s identity.  He stated that the auction’s credit 
department employees are “[t]he [only] people who need to know.”  Id. (quoting 
Geoffrey Russell, Director of Sales at Keeneland). 
 126 Campbell, supra note 19. 
 127 See Thane Peterson, The Art of the Auction, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Nov. 18, 
2003, http://www.businessweek.com/print/bwdaily/dnflash/nov2003/nf20031118_2361_ 
db028.htm?chan=db (noting that most pieces for sale at Sotheby’s Contemporary Art 
auction are listed only as coming “from a private collection”). 
 128 See Campbell, supra note 19. 
 129 See, e.g., Cain, Question Remains, supra note 125; Cain, Sanan Calls for 
Reforms, supra note 108; Cain, Sanan Devotes Himself, supra note 5. 
 130 See Cain, Sanan Devotes Himself, supra note 5. 
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rights with the value of full disclosure and settled on 
“encouraging,” but not requiring, agents and consignors131 to 
disclose the true owner.132  If they refuse to disclose these 
anonymous owners, the potential purchasers’ only recourse is 
“deleting the horse from further consideration.”133  
Article III of the Code detailed the bloodstock agent’s 
role in thoroughbred auctions.134  It emphasized that dual 
agency without disclosure is “inherently fraudulent.”135  In 
order to remedy this problem, the Task Force encouraged 
principals to require that their agents sign the Agent 
Disclosure Agreement,136 which is one of the sample forms that 
the Task Force released along with the Code of Ethics.  This 
Agreement clearly articulates what is expected of the parties 
and delineates the fiduciary duties that the agent owes to his 
principal, including disclosure of any “adverse interests” that 
the agent has in the transaction.137  Although TOBA lacks the 
  
 131 A consignor is a “person or agency responsible for offering a horse for sale 
at auction.”  AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 100. 
 132 TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS (original version), supra note 116, art. II; see also 
Cain, Ethics Code, supra note 19. 
The supplying of ownership information is not held to be a requirement 
under this Code of Ethics.  However, all sale companies are requested to 
encourage consignors and consigning agents to reveal all information about 
ownership which a prospective buyer or buyer’s agent might seek, both on the 
catalogue page and verbally.  The prospective buyer has every right to ask 
the consignor anything relative to the horse’s condition and ownership, and if 
such information is unsatisfactory, he/she has the recourse of deleting the 
horse from further consideration.  Also, prospective buyers, especially those 
new to the industry, should be informed of the commercial products available 
which provide some of this information.  Following the sale, the sale company 
will make every effort to provide to the public the most complete and accurate 
information on buyers and sellers possible, consistent with the above cited 
protections of privacy. 
TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS (original version), supra note 116, art. II.   
 133 TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS (original version), supra note 116, art. II. 
 134 Id. art. III. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id.; Sales Integrity Program, Agent Disclosure Agreement, 
http://www.salesintegrity.org/downloads/disclosure.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2007) 
[hereinafter Agent Disclosure Agreement]. 
 137 The Agent Disclosure Agreement reads in part: 
AGENT acknowledges that AGENT acts as BUYER’s fiduciary with respect 
to its obligations under this AGREEMENT.  The following acts or omissions, 
but not limited to these acts and omissions, shall constitute a breach of 
AGENT’S fiduciary duties to BUYER: (a) communicating any false or 
misleading information to BUYER regarding any horse under BUYER’s 
consideration as recommended by AGENT; (b) failing to disclose to BUYER 
the true price at which any horse under consideration by BUYER has been 
offered for sale at the auction; (c) arranging with any person or persons to bid 
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authority to punish an agent who signs the Agent Disclosure 
Agreement and then violates its provisions, the document 
would serve as strong evidentiary support for a buyer’s breach 
of fiduciary duty claim against the agent.138   
Finally, Article IV of the Code of Ethics articulated 
TOBA’s plan to have a copy of the Code displayed at every 
auction and to cooperate with sales companies to make 
information about horse sales more readily available for 
auction participants.139  To ensure that information about the 
Code of Ethics is easily accessible to all interested parties, the 
Task Force mailed packets of information to registered 
thoroughbred owners and those who had recently applied for 
credit at the major auction companies, and also developed 
public service announcements to run at the auctions.140  The 
Task Force also distributed copies of the Code and the Agent 
Disclosure Agreement to the sales companies so that both 
documents would be available for buyers and their agents at 
the auctions.141 
V. HURDLES TO ENFORCEMENT: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL 
BARRIERS TO ETHICS OVERHAUL 
On August 5, 2005, TOBA announced that it was 
postponing implementation of Article I: Veterinary Practices.142  
  
on a horse for BUYER at an inflated price; (d) entering into any other 
agreement with any person with respect to any transaction involving the sale 
of a horse to BUYER, other than an agreement which has been fully disclosed 
to BUYER and which BUYER has consented to in writing; or, (e) failing to 
disclose to BUYER any ownership interest of AGENT in any horse BUYER 
has under consideration; (f) otherwise acting in any manner contrary to the 
best interests of BUYER. 
Agent Disclosure Agreement, supra note 136. 
 138 Sales Integrity Task Force Releases Code of Ethics, 
THOROUGHBREDTIMES.COM, Dec. 16, 2004, http://www.thoroughbredtimes.com/ 
national-news/2004/December/16/Sales-Integrity-Task-Force-releases-code-of-ethics.aspx.  
Cot Campbell explains, “We can’t put someone in jail, but if someone signs this 
agreement and breaches it, then legal action can be taken.”  Id. 
 139 TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS (original version), supra note 116, art. IV. 
 140 See Deirdre B. Biles, Sales Integrity Program Committee Addresses 
Concerns over Surgery Disclosure, BLOODHORSE.COM, Aug. 1, 2005, 
http://www.bloodhorse.com/articleindex/article.asp?id=29312 [hereinafter Biles, Sales 
Integrity Program]. 
 141 See Deirdre B. Biles, Education on Sale Code of Ethics to Start at Fasig-
Tipton Calder Sale, BLOODHORSE.COM, Feb. 25, 2005, http://auctions.bloodhorse.com/ 
viewstory.asp?id=26872 [hereinafter Biles, Education on Sale]. 
 142 Press Release, Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Ass’n, Mandatory 
Disclosure of Vet Practices Postponed (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://www.bloodhorse.com/ 
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The Task Force completely removed this Article (and any 
mention of it) from the official Code on its Web site.143  The 
“postponement” came after consignors voiced their concern 
with how the thoroughbred auction industry could keep track 
of so many horses’ medical histories.144  This surprise 
announcement seemed to confirm some industry insiders’ 
criticism that the Code’s drafters never really thought through 
how to enforce its provisions.145   
Although the Code of Ethics was largely well-received in 
the thoroughbred industry,146 its positive reception was 
tempered by a pervasive lack of confidence that these new rules 
could actually change the way bloodstock transactions had 
always been conducted.147  Critics questioned what real 
penalties Code violators faced and whether TOBA or its Task 
Force possessed any legitimate authority to administer these 
disciplinary provisions.148  After all, the Code never refers to 
punishment for violations.149  It does not even mention where to 
report alleged violations.150  Since TOBA developed the Code, it 
would be reasonable to assume that complainants should 
report violations to the Association, just as violations of the 
British Code of Practice are to be reported to the HRA.151  The 
Code of Ethics, however, expressly limits TOBA’s role to 
“making relevant forms and publications readily 
  
articleindex/article.asp?id=29376 [hereinafter Press Release, TOBA, Mandatory 
Disclosure]. 
 143 Compare TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 12, with TOBA, CODE OF 
ETHICS (original version), supra note 116 (showing that the veterinary practices 
provisions from the original Code of Ethics are removed in the updated version).  
Article I of the Code of Ethics (original version) has yet to be reinstated, and there is no 
evidence that TOBA intends to do so in the future. 
 144 Biles, Sales Integrity Program, supra note 140.  “Issues and concerns 
raised include development of an effective record-keeping process at veterinary clinics, 
and development of a centralized database to capture and maintain the information.”  
Press Release, TOBA, Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 142.   
 145 See Campbell, supra note 19. 
 146 See, e.g., Marcus Green, Fasig-Tipton Sale Puts Ethics Code to Test, 
COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), July 19, 2005, at 1D (noting that the Code of Ethics 
“appears to be working”). 
 147 See, e.g., Rachel Pagones, Bloodstock Desk: Ethics Code a Long Time 
Coming, but Will It Work?, RACING POST, Dec. 17, 2004, Sport, at 17 (pointing out that 
“ethical people will already be abiding by [these] guidelines”). 
 148 See supra note 19. 
 149 See TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 12. 
 150 See id. 
 151 See THE JOCKEY CLUB, CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 10 (explaining the 
procedure for reporting breaches of the Code of Practice); see also E-mail from Owen 
Byrne, supra note 101 (confirming that individuals with information should now report 
violations of the Code of Practice to the HRA). 
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available . . . and providing other guidance to facilitate an 
owner’s due diligence and successful participation in an 
auction.”152  With no official body to investigate Code violations, 
and no stated penalties for these violations, critics were left 
wondering how the Code could possibly correct fraudulent 
auction practices.153 
The Task Force’s decision to “encourage,”154 but not 
require, full ownership disclosure was another major point of 
contention for the detractors, especially horse sellers.  As one 
consignor explained, “They want the sellers to reveal 
everything that has been done to a horse, but the buyers get to 
conduct their business under a veil of secrecy.”155  Privacy 
rights ultimately prevailed over the need for full ownership 
disclosure, but it is clear that the problems Satish Sanan 
articulated about anonymous sellers156 are not based on 
abstract fear, but rather, an informed sense of how unethical 
bidding has become customary auction practice.  Since the 
Code of Ethics does not require full ownership disclosure, an 
agent can easily bid on his principal’s horse to run up the 
purchase price without being detected.  Even though the 
Conditions of Sale expressly permit bi-bidding,157 the buyer 
bidding against the seller’s agent might be interested to know 
that the other “bidder” only intends to run up the price. 
One article entitled A Beginner’s Guide to Selling 
Thoroughbred Horses in a Public Auction Setting actually 
encourages new owners to bid on their own horse to run up the 
price.158  This article explains that “some people view consigned 
  
 152 TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 12. 
 153 See, e.g., Tom LaMarra, Sanan: Regulation of Sales Business Needs ‘Teeth,’ 
BLOODHORSE.COM, July 4, 2004, http://news.bloodhorse.com/viewstory.asp?id=23256 
(arguing that, without enforcement provisions, the Code of Ethics is just a set of 
conditions that will go unread and unenforced). 
 154 TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS (original version), supra note 116, art. I. 
 155 Deirdre B. Biles, Code of Ethics Follow-Through Called Critical, 
BLOODHORSE.COM, Dec. 27, 2004, http://www.bloodhorse.com/articleindex/ 
article.asp?id=25948 [hereinafter Biles, Code of Ethics].  Note that this statement was 
made before TOBA announced it was postponing mandatory disclosure of medical 
procedures.  See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text. 
 156 See supra text accompanying notes 129-30. 
 157 See supra note 2. 
 158 See Jonathan F. Wallace & Allen F. Wysocki, A Beginner’s Guide to Selling 
Thoroughbred Horses in a Public Auction Setting 3 (Inst. of Food & Agric. Sci., Univ. of 
Fla., 2000), available at http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pdffiles/SN/SN00500.pdf.  It is worth 
noting that one of only two sources cited by Wallace and Wysocki is Lightning in a Jar 
by Cot Campbell, Chairman of the Sales Integrity Task Force.  See id. at 4. 
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bidding as unethical, even though the rules clearly permit it.”159  
This is precisely the problem.  The “rules” do not address the 
fraud that pervades many equine sales.  It seems hypocritical 
for the industry to discourage misrepresentation of horses at 
public auction,160 yet allow owners to artificially manipulate the 
horses’ market value in other ways.  By allowing fraud to 
become custom,161 the thoroughbred industry has perpetuated 
its own flaws, rather than acknowledging and extinguishing 
them.  The Code of Ethics is a step in the right direction, but 
the American horse racing community has a long way to go 
before it has a truly effective system of auction regulation. 
A. Agency and Thoroughbred Auctions 
By its very nature, agency raises ethical issues.162  An 
agent is a fiduciary of his principal; therefore, he has a duty of 
loyalty to his principal which requires that he act solely in his 
principal’s best interest.163  Although agents are obligated to 
work exclusively for their principals’ interests, they may have 
their own countervailing interests in these transactions.164  An 
agent breaches his fiduciary duty to his principal when he 
places these personal interests above those of his principal.165   
  
 159 Id. at 3. 
 160 See TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS (original version), supra note 116, art. I. 
 161 In Bexwell v. Christie, (1776) 1 Cowp. 395, a dispute over the sale of a 
gelding at auction, Lord Mansfield spoke out against sellers hiring “puffers” to run up 
the purchase price of the goods for sale: 
The matter in question is in itself of small value; but in respect of the 
principles by which it must be governed, it is a matter of great 
importance. . . . [T]ricks and practices of this kind daily increase, and grow so 
frequent that good men give into the ways of the bad and dishonest in their 
own defence.  But such a practice was never openly avowed.  An owner of 
goods set up to sale at an auction never yet bid in the room for himself.  If 
such a practice were allowed, no one would bid.  It is a fraud upon the sale 
and upon the public. . . . [I]t is no argument to say it is a frequent custom. 
2 SAMUEL LIVERMORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT AND OF SALES 
BY AUCTION 337-38 (1818) (emphasis added) (quoting Bexwell, 1 Cowp. at 395). 
 162 See Ronald F. Dushka, Why Be a Loyal Agent?  A Systemic Ethical 
Analysis, in ETHICS AND AGENCY THEORY 143, 143 (Norman E. Bowie & R. Edward 
Freeman eds., 1992). 
 163 Jeswald W. Salacuse, Law and Power in Agency Relationships, in 
NEGOTIATING ON BEHALF OF OTHERS: ADVICE TO LAWYERS, BUSINESS EXECUTIVES, 
SPORTS AGENTS, DIPLOMATS, POLITICIANS, AND EVERYBODY ELSE 157, 158-59 (Robert 
H. Mnookin & Lawrence E. Susskind eds., 1999). 
 164 Id. 
 165 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958) (“Unless otherwise 
agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the 
principal in all matters connected with his agency.”). 
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An agent’s duty of loyalty is particularly complicated by 
the reality of American thoroughbred auctions.  In the United 
States, bloodstock agents are typically involved in more than 
one sale at an auction.166  Although an agent may be bidding on 
behalf of one client, “more than likely [he] also has horses [at 
the auction] to sell.”167  For example, one owner’s purchasing 
agent might also be employed as the selling agent for another 
thoroughbred owner, or this agent might even be selling his 
own horses at the auction.  This situation is not inherently 
fraudulent, but it creates a conflict of interest which the agent 
is obligated to disclose to his principal.168  This conflict is the 
“paradox of agency in the market system.”169  Society needs 
agents to operate on others’ behalf,170 yet the very structure of 
the principal/agent relationship fosters self-interested 
behavior.171 
This “paradox” proves especially relevant in the world of 
thoroughbred sales.  “The role of bloodstock agent is based on 
trust. However, it also is a highly ambiguous role.  It is 
associated with a degree of skullduggery and chicanery.  It is 
not quite criminal (although in some cases it has been), but it 
takes place at the margins of acceptable behavior.”172  Many of 
the purchasers at today’s auctions are new to the industry.173  
Therefore, they often lack the auction experience and equine 
knowledge necessary to effectuate the most advantageous 
purchases.174  At the very least, novice buyers, many of whom 
are successful in other business ventures,175 probably lack the 
  
 166 See AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 69. 
 167 Id. 
 168 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387. 
 169 Dushka, supra note 162, at 144. 
 170 “Agency makes it possible for . . . actors to expand the range of their 
economic activities by increasing the number of transactions that they can complete 
within a given time.”  Id. (quoting BUSINESS LAW AND THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
334 (Michael J. Metzger et al. eds., 6th ed. 1986)).  
 171 Id.  
 172 Rebecca Cassidy, Falling in Love with Horses: The International 
Thoroughbred Auction, 13 SOC’Y & ANIMALS 51, 53 (2005) (comparing bloodstock agents 
to the “trickster” figures in anthropology). 
 173 See Miller, supra note 5, at 789; see also Paul Pringle, To Race, She Had to 
Pony Up, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 2006, at 1 (referring to horse racing as “a $26-billion-a-
year industry that depends on drawing fresh ranks of amateurs to auction stables”). 
 174 See Bandes, supra note 38, at 789 (citing Dennis Tilton, Fraud in the Sale 
of a Show Horse, 39 AM. JUR. TRIALS 527, 541 (1989)). 
 175 Miller, supra note 5, at 789.  Thoroughbred owner Jess Jackson, now 
pursuing a lawsuit in California based on his agents’ secret commissions, see infra text 
accompanying notes 188-96, made billions of dollars in the wine business before 
entering the thoroughbred industry.  See Drape, A Horseman’s Lawsuit, supra note 4.  
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time to fully educate themselves about horses and the 
thoroughbred market.176  To combat their equine ignorance, 
most new buyers seek the assistance of knowledgeable, 
experienced horsemen, a practice that seems to be 
recommended by every “new buyer” guide available.177  These 
new buyers typically hire bloodstock agents to select horses 
and do the actual bidding for them at auction.  The agents’ 
experience, knowledge, and time make up for what their novice 
clients lack. 
What many of these new buyers do not lack, however, is 
dispensable income with which to purchase their first 
racehorses.178  The temptation to exploit wealthy, novice 
principals’ inexperience can prove to be too great for some 
unscrupulous bloodstock agents.179  In one illustrative case, 
experienced horseman Richard Shockey approached Paul 
Gussin and his son Frederic and suggested that they purchase 
a thoroughbred.180  Neither of the Gussins had any experience 
with horses or racing, but Shockey offered to advise them on 
details such as which racehorses to buy, how to care for them, 
  
Another prominent owner bringing fraud claims against his former agents, James 
McIngvale, known as “Mattress Mac,” first made his fortune as a furniture retailer.  
See Ray Paulick, Strange Bedfellows, BLOODHORSE.COM, Sept. 12, 2006, 
http://opinions.bloodhorse.com/ viewstory.asp?id=35285.  
 176 As one veteran horse owner observed, “You see it over and over . . . . People 
who are successful in other businesses come in with ‘victim’ written across their 
foreheads.”  Tom LaMarra, Panel: Ethics Code for Horse Sales Needs Teeth, 
BLOODHORSE.COM, Dec. 9, 2004, http://www.bloodhorse.com/articleindex/ 
article.asp?id=25743 (quoting Joe Harper, President of the Del Mar Thoroughbred 
Club). 
 177 See, e.g., AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 67 (“Your 
mantra should be simply: Don’t go it alone.”); BRIT. HORSERACING BD., THE THRILL OF 
OWNERSHIP: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO OWNING A RACEHORSE 13, 
http://www.britishhorseracing.com/owning_breeding/ownership/BHB_Practical_Guide.
pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2007) (advising novice owners that “it is important to enlist 
the support of a trainer or bloodstock agent” when purchasing a racehorse, because 
“[t]he quality of advice you receive at this stage is likely to have a major influence in 
your future success”); Keeneland Thoroughbred Racing & Sales, How to Bid at the 
Sale, http://ww2.keeneland.com/sales/lists/copy/bid.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2007) 
(encouraging potential bidders “to find a qualified bloodstock advisor” before 
undertaking the “unique task” of buying a horse at auction); ARNOLD KIRKPATRICK, 
INVESTING IN THOROUGHBREDS 47 (2001) (“You may be Albert Einstein in the building 
business or the rag trade, but you’re going to need help in the Thoroughbred 
Business.”); NEW THOROUGHBRED OWNERS HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 21 (warning 
newcomers to overcome the urge to select their horses without assistance, because 
“novice owners who go it alone risk setbacks and even failure”). 
 178 See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 179 See AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 56 (“Many an 
eager newcomer has fallen victim to unscrupulous characters sometimes acting on 
their own or in concert with sellers.”).   
 180 Gussin v. Shockey, 725 F. Supp. 271, 272-73 (D. Md. 1989). 
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and how to go about selling them.181  In exchange for the 
services provided by his twenty years of experience in the 
thoroughbred industry,182 Shockey was to receive five percent of 
the net profits from these horse transactions.183  Unbeknownst 
to the Gussins, Shockey made arrangements with the sellers 
wherein he kept all money paid by the Gussins that was above 
a set price determined by the seller and Shockey.184  The 
Gussins eventually discovered Shockey’s secret profits and 
sued him for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud.185  Although 
Shockey maintained that he was not acting as the Gussins’ 
“formal” agent,186 the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Maryland disagreed, finding that he violated his fiduciary duty 
to the Gussins by failing to disclose the “kickbacks” he 
received.187 
An agent’s secret commissions are also at the forefront 
of a high-profile lawsuit now pending in California Superior 
Court in San Diego.188  Billionaire Jess Jackson,189 owner of 
Kendall-Jackson Vineyard Estates, sued his three bloodstock 
agents/advisors for fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of 
fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment in connection with the 
purchase of several racehorses.190  Jackson, who has spent tens 
of millions of dollars on thoroughbreds since entering the 
industry in 2003,191 alleges that his advisors “obtained secret 
  
 181 Id.   
 182 Id. at 272. 
 183 Id. at 273. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. at 272.  The Gussins also alleged that Shockey violated the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), based on a partnership that Paul 
and Frederic Gussin had formed to handle their horse business.  Shockey had only a 
tenuous association with this partnership, however, since he purchased horses for the 
Gussins as individuals, not for their partnership.  The court granted Shockey’s motion 
for summary judgment on the RICO claim, concluding that the Gussins’ partnership 
was “neither the object nor the tool” of the alleged illegal conduct, as required for a 
RICO violation.  Id. at 276-77. 
 186 Gussin, 725 F. Supp. at 273. 
 187 Id. at 275. 
 188 Bessie Gregory, Bloodstock Desk: US Owner Files Law Suit Against 
Former Advisors, RACING POST, Oct. 10, 2005, Sport, at 19. 
 189   Forbes has listed Jackson as one of the world’s richest people for the past 
several years.  The magazine recently estimated his wealth at $2.2 billion.  Luisa Kroll 
& Allison Fass, The World’s Billionaires, FORBES, Mar. 7, 2007, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2007/10/07billionaires_The-Worlds-Billionaires_Name 
HTML.html. 
 190 Gregory, supra note 188; Ray Paulick, Owner Jackson Files Suit Against 
Ex-Advisors, BLOODHORSE.COM, Oct. 5, 2005, http://www.bloodhorse.com/articleindex/ 
article.asp?id=30354 [hereinafter Paulick, Owner Jackson Files Suit]. 
 191 Paulick, Owner Jackson Files Suit, supra note 190. 
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commissions, payments, or profits or other things of value from 
consignors, sellers, or other agents in return for assuring that 
[he] would purchase their horses or interests in horses at 
inflated prices.”192  Jackson claims that his bloodstock agents 
reported inflated purchase prices for thoroughbreds they 
bought on his behalf,193 pocketing the difference between the 
amount Jackson paid and the actual sale prices.194  In some of 
these transactions, the seller allegedly colluded with Jackson’s 
agents to artificially inflate the purchase price.195  These “secret 
commissions” totaled approximately $3.2 million,196 according to 
the complaint.   
With his case still pending, Jackson backed a bill filed 
on January 24, 2006 in the Kentucky House of Representatives 
by Representative Denver Butler of Louisville.197  This bill 
focused on preventing fraud by agents involved in the purchase 
and sale of horses.198  Similar to TOBA’s Code of Ethics, the bill 
prohibits agents from taking secret commissions and makes it 
illegal for an agent to represent both the buyer and the seller 
without their knowledge and written consent.199  Kentucky 
Governor Ernie Fletcher signed the bill into law on March 28, 
2006.200  
  
 192 Id. 
 193 The alleged violations of fiduciary duty dealt with purchases both at public 
auction and private sales.  Id. 
 194 See Gregory, supra note 188; Paulick, Owner Jackson Files Suit, supra 
note 190.  In one transaction, bloodstock agent Emmanuel de Seroux told Jackson that 
he purchased a colt for $850,000; however, the seller only received $675,000.  Id. 
 195 At the Keeneland auction in September of 2004, Jackson paid $450,000 for 
a yearling, but his suit alleges that his agent, trainer Bruce Headley, received an 
undisclosed commission from the thoroughbred’s consignor.  Paulick, Owner Jackson 
Files Suit, supra note 190. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Ray Paulick, Bill Would Seek to Protect Kentucky Horse Buyers, 
BLOODHORSE.COM, Jan. 25, 2006, http://news.bloodhorse.com/viewstory.asp?id=31915 
[hereinafter Paulick, Bill Would Seek to Protect].  The legislation applies not only to 
thoroughbreds, but to all breeds of horses, as long as the horse in question is “used for 
racing or showing.”  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 230.357(1) (West 2006). 
 198 See H.R. 446 (Ky. 2006), available at http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/06RS/ 
HB446/bill.doc; Paulick, Bill Would Seek to Protect, supra note 197. 
 199 See H.R. 446, supra note 198. 
 200 Dual Agency Bill Signed by Kentucky Governor, BLOODHORSE.COM, Mar. 
28, 2006, http://www.bloodhorse.com/articleindex/article.asp?id=32772. 
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Unlike insurance201 and real estate agents,202 bloodstock 
agents do not have to be licensed by the state, or even a specific 
organization, to purchase and sell horses for their clients.203  
Bloodstock agents do not even need written agreements with 
their principals that expressly authorize them to bid or sell on 
the owners’ behalf.204  Since essentially anyone can become a 
bloodstock agent,205 new buyers have no assurance that the 
agents they choose are as experienced or successful as they 
claim.  Reputation is crucial to this industry, but these novices 
usually lack sufficient industry contacts to fully investigate the 
agent’s credibility in the racing world.  As a result, it is not 
uncommon for new horse owners to be taken advantage of by 
their agents.  The Code of Ethics for Thoroughbred Auctions 
spotlights the risk of bloodstock agent fraud, but the Code has 
no provisions to punish agents or compensate owners once this 
fraud has occurred. 
B. Who Is in Charge?: How the Structure of the American 
Thoroughbred Industry Cripples Its Attempts at 
Regulation 
1. The British System of Regulation  
In the United Kingdom, the HRA has a great deal of 
authority over the conduct of trainers and owners, whom the 
HRA must license and register, respectively.206  Upon licensing 
  
 201 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Insurance Sales 
Agents, in OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2006-07 EDITION, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos118.htm (showing that insurance agents “must obtain a 
license in the States where they plan to do their selling”). 
 202 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Real Estate Brokers 
and Sales Agents, in OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2006-07 EDITION, available 
at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos120.htm (showing that a real estate license “is required in 
every State and the District of Columbia”). 
 203 AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 50. 
 204 In Gussin v. Shockey, Shockey “was reluctant to characterize his role as 
that of a formal agent of the Gussins.”  Gussin, 725 F. Supp. at 273.  However, based on 
the services he provided for the Gussins and the documents he executed on their 
behalf, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland held that Shockey was 
operating as an agent for the Gussins.  Id. 
 205 See Miller, supra note 5, at 825 (noting that in order to be considered a 
bloodstock agent, “[o]ne need only declare himself or herself to be a bloodstock agent”).     
 206 See Powers of the HRA, supra note 68.  British lawyer Justin Wadham, 
who specializes in horsetrading issues, explains:  “With trainers, [the Code of Practice] 
has everything it needs.  Not only is there a code of conduct but every trainer has to 
apply for a new licence annually.  There’s every opportunity for the Jockey Club 
repeatedly to warn trainers of the dire consequences of financial impropriety.”  Evans, 
Foodbroker Case, supra note 84. 
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or registration, these trainers and owners agree to be bound by 
the HRA’s Rules of Racing.207  However, British bloodstock 
agents are not licensed or registered, so they cannot be bound 
by the Rules of Racing.208  Unlike the disciplinary measures the 
HRA can take against unscrupulous trainers or owners, such 
as imposing fines and revoking licenses, the British horse 
racing industry’s ability to directly penalize bloodstock agents 
is somewhat limited.209  The Federation of Bloodstock Agents 
itself has a Code of Working Ethics banning such practices;210 
however, much like TOBA, membership in the Federation is 
optional.  Many of the most successful agents are not even 
members;211 thus, they cannot be charged with violations of the 
Federation’s Code.   
Although the HRA lacks direct authority over agents 
(assuming the agents are not licensed as trainers) and other 
unlicensed individuals, violating the Code of Practice could still 
prove disastrous for their careers since the HRA licenses all 
British racecourses.212  Rule 2(v) of the Rules of Racing 
empowers the HRA to exclude any person from any of the 
HRA’s licensed premises, even those people whom the HRA 
does not license or register.213  Thus, even though the HRA 
cannot directly bar these unlicensed violators from working as 
bloodstock agents in the future, it can banish them from all 
British racecourses, making it nearly impossible for these 
violators to ever again obtain employment in horse racing.214 
  
 207 See Powers of the HRA, supra note 68.   
 208 See id. 
 209 See id. 
 210 FED’N OF BLOODSTOCK AGENTS, CODE OF WORKING ETHICS (2006), 
available at http://www.race-horses.com/agents/fba/fba_guidelines.htm. 
 211 For example, Charlie Gordon-Watson, the bloodstock agent accused of 
accepting kickbacks in the sale of Foodbroker Fancy, see supra notes 74-83 and 
accompanying text, is not a member of the Federation of Bloodstock Agents.  Evans, 
Horsetrading Scandal, supra note 74. 
 212 See Horseracing Regulatory Authority, About the Horseracing Regulatory 
Authority, http://www.thehra.org/doc.php?id=2 (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 213 RULES OF RACING R. 2(v) (2006), available at http://www.thehra.org/ 
pdf.php?id=44657&filename=orders_and_rules_of_racing; Powers of the HRA, supra 
note 68. 
 214 Richard Evans, Bloodstock Crackdown, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 
22, 2004 (noting that, although the Jockey Club could not actually prevent violators 
from attending the auctions and purchasing horses, the publicity surrounding their 
punishment in the racing world and in news media would “render them pariahs in 
racing circles”).  It is important to note that individuals may also be excluded from 
racetracks in the United States.  However, American thoroughbred racetracks are 
licensed by the state, not TOBA.  Therefore, unlike violations of the Code of Practice in 
the United Kingdom, Code of Ethics violations are unlikely to result in exclusion.  For a 
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2. The American System of Regulation 
The American thoroughbred industry lacks a regulatory 
body comparable to the United Kingdom’s HRA or its 
predecessor, the Jockey Club.  TOBA is a well-respected 
association with great influence, but it is merely a trade 
association215 without licensing or registration authority.  
Membership in TOBA is purely optional for owners and 
breeders and bestows no special benefits,216 the loss of which 
might deter the fraudulent activity prohibited by the Code of 
Ethics.  The United States has its own Jockey Club, but the 
American Jockey Club does not serve the regulatory purpose 
once maintained by its United Kingdom counterpart.217  
Although it did, at one time, police thoroughbred racing,218 the 
U.S. Jockey Club is now mainly responsible for maintaining 
The American Stud Book, a thoroughbred registry.219 
Although “secret commissions” and “kickbacks” are 
themselves prohibited by law,220 with the court usually ordering 
the unscrupulous agent to hand over the illegal profits to his 
principal,221 simple mathematics show why even the law cannot 
  
detailed account of racetrack exclusion in the United States, see John J. Kropp, J. 
Jeffrey Landen & Monica A. Donath, Exclusion of Patrons and Horsemen from 
Racetracks: A Legal, Practical and Constitutional Dilemma, 74 KY. L.J. 739 (1986). 
 215 Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Association, TOBA Membership, 
http://www.toba.org/membership (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 216 The benefits of TOBA membership include a membership directory, 
discounts on seminars, free admission to certain racetrack clubhouses, and a free 
magazine subscription.  Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Ass’n, Member Benefits, 
http://www.toba.org/membership/benefits.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 217 See The Jockey Club (U.S.), About the Jockey Club, 
http://www.jockeyclub.com/about_TJC.asp [hereinafter The Jockey Club (U.S.), About 
the Jockey Club] (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).  
 218 BARNEY NAGLER, THE AMERICAN HORSE 106 (1966). 
 219 This registry documents all thoroughbred foals born in the United States, 
Canada, and Puerto Rico, as well as some horses imported into these countries.  The 
Jockey Club (U.S.), About the Jockey Club, supra note 217. 
 220 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 (explaining that agents have 
a duty to give their principals any profits arising from their agency, unless the parties 
have agreed otherwise). There may also be criminal repercussions for offering or 
accepting a secret commission.  For example, New York’s misdemeanor “commercial 
bribery” statutes prohibit an individual from offering a benefit to an agent without the 
principal’s consent, and prohibit an agent from soliciting or accepting such benefit, 
with the intent to influence the agent’s conduct in regards to his principal’s affairs.  
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 180.00, 180.05 (McKinney 2006).  If the benefit conferred on or 
offered to the agent exceeds $1,000 and causes the principal at least $250 in economic 
harm, the bribery becomes a felony.  Id. §§ 180.03, 180.08; Miller, supra note 5, at 827. 
 221 “If an agent receives anything as a result of his violation of a duty of 
loyalty to the principal, he is subject to a liability to deliver it, its value, or its proceeds, 
to the principal.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 403 (1958). 
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effectively deter these deceptive practices.  If a bloodstock 
agent takes a “kickback” in several or all of his thoroughbred 
transactions, he is unlikely to be caught for each one.  
Therefore, even if his fraud was detected and prosecuted in a 
few of those transactions, requiring him to disgorge these 
profits to his principal, the deceptive agent is still likely to 
come out on top.222 
Without a regulatory body like the Horseracing 
Regulatory Authority to implement and enforce its provisions, 
TOBA’s Code of Ethics is more of an empty promise than an 
assurance of fairness.  A code of ethics without a means of 
enforcement is essentially meaningless.223  In order to be 
effective, codes of ethics must be clear and detailed, with 
carefully delineated repercussions.224  The process of reporting 
the complaint and the steps taken to investigate the complaint 
must be explicitly conveyed in the code,225 or else its provisions 
are little more than a statement of ideals to which industry 
members claim to aspire.226      
If the overt penalties for contravention of codes are minimalist, the 
appearance can be given of the codes being window-dressing, 
intended to promote . . . rhetoric . . . but not in a meaningful sense to 
address professional abuses. . . . [T]he absence of effective sanctions 
for non-compliance with ethical prescriptions significantly detracts 
from their value.  Inherent in this interpretation is the 
  
 222 Agents who breach their fiduciary duties not only have to turn over any 
“kickbacks” or otherwise illegal profits, they also lose the commission originally agreed 
upon with their principal.   
An agent is entitled to no compensation for conduct which is disobedient or 
which is a breach of his duty of loyalty; if such conduct constitutes a wilful 
and deliberate breach of his contract of service, he is not entitled to 
compensation even for properly performed services for which no 
compensation is apportioned. 
Id. § 469. 
 223 “A code is merely a piece of paper with words if penalties for non-
compliance are not applied.”  Margaret M. Coady, The Moral Domain of Professionals, 
in CODES OF ETHICS AND THE PROFESSIONS 28, 48 (Margaret Coady & Sidney Bloch 
eds., 1996) (quoting JACK M. BEHRMAN, ESSAYS ON ETHICS IN BUSINESS AND THE 
PROFESSIONS 155 (1988)); see also NAT’L CONSUMER COUNCIL (U.K.), MODELS OF SELF-
REGULATION: AN OVERVIEW OF MODELS IN BUSINESS AND THE PROFESSIONS 16 (2000), 
available at http://www.ncc.org.uk/regulation/models_self_regulation.pdf (identifying 
the three elements common to most forms of regulation: rules, “monitoring and 
enforcement of the rules,” and a redress system, and noting that “unless all three 
[elements] are covered somehow, the regulation is unlikely to be effective”). 
 224 See Judith Lichtenberg, What Are Codes of Ethics For?, in CODES OF 
ETHICS AND THE PROFESSIONS, supra note 223, at 13, 27. 
 225 See Loane Skene, A Legal Perspective on Codes of Ethics, in CODES OF 
ETHICS AND THE PROFESSIONS, supra note 223, at 111, 115. 
 226 See id. at 129. 
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instrumentalist notion that the value of codes lies not so much in 
their articulation of ideal standards of conduct but in their capacity 
to regulate unsatisfactory conduct.227 
It is very easy for the thoroughbred industry to speak out 
against the fraudulent activity occurring at its auctions.  The 
real test of a firm commitment to improvement lies in 
implementation of these asserted ideals.228 
VI. IS THERE ANY HOPE FOR TOBA’S “TOOTHLESS TIGER?”  
If all TOBA sought to achieve by developing the Code 
was improving the horse racing industry’s public image, then 
arguably, it has achieved that minor aspiration. At the very 
least, the Code of Ethics makes it clear that the American 
thoroughbred industry (at least those members represented in 
TOBA) is aware of fraud in horse sales and has asserted its 
disapproval.229  Novice owners might feel more confident 
entering the intimidating world of thoroughbred auctions if 
they feel that someone is looking out for their best interests by 
spotlighting potential problem areas.  TOBA is clearly 
concerned with the effect that this fraud could have on novice 
horsemen,230 whose inexperience already places them at a 
disadvantage when entering the competitive world of 
thoroughbred racing.  If TOBA just hopes to quell new owners’ 
fears about an inherently unfair thoroughbred market, to 
assure that these novices will continue to invest, then the Code 
is, arguably, sufficient.  Just as in the stock market, no one 
would invest in thoroughbred racing if the market was 
unfair.231  There must be some assurance, some way of 
guaranteeing that what is for sale is being accurately 
represented.  For some new owners, perhaps TOBA’s Code of 
  
 227 Ian Freckelton, Enforcement of Ethics, in CODES OF ETHICS AND THE 
PROFESSIONS, supra note 223, at 130, 143-44 (footnote omitted) (describing what 
Freckelton refers to as the “legalistic” approach to codes of ethics). 
 228 See id. 
 229 See generally TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 12. 
 230 See Sales Integrity Task Force, Mission, supra note 113 (“The project was 
specifically geared to the needs of new investors . . . .”); see also Dan Liebman & 
Deirdre B. Biles, Code of Ethics for Auctions Announced, BLOODHORSE.COM, Dec. 17, 
2004 (“Our mission in all of this was . . . to create a road map for the new buyer and let 
him know what he should expect and what is not acceptable.” (quoting Cot Campbell)). 
 231 See, e.g., 2 LIVERMORE, supra note 161, at 337-38 (warning that if public 
auctions tolerated fraudulent bidding practices, “no one would bid” (quoting Bexwell v. 
Christie, (1776) 1 Cowp. 395)). 
2007] PUTTING THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE 1093 
Ethics provides that necessary reassurance that the racehorse 
industry will not stand for a fraudulent marketplace.    
This assurance is necessary for the industry to maintain 
its allure of elusive victory, the promise that every individual 
has a full and fair opportunity to participate and win.232  This is 
what lures new investors to both the thoroughbred market and 
the stock market.  In each industry, however, the odds are not 
in the newcomer’s favor.  There will always be players with 
more information, more experience, and more skill.  Investing 
in any competitive market brings no assurance of success.233  
No investor can be guaranteed that his stock is going to 
increase in value, just as no thoroughbred buyer can be certain 
that his colt will be the next Secretariat.234  If the Code 
convinces these new owners, however, that they will at least 
have a fair chance of “getting what they paid for,” then it has 
successfully improved the industry’s reputation and restored 
newcomers’ faith.  
Of course, if TOBA has no intention of actually 
enforcing its Code of Ethics, the Code is really only giving these 
newcomers false hope.  False hope might lure new investors 
into the market, but it cannot keep them there.235  If, however, 
TOBA released the Code of Ethics for Thoroughbred Auctions 
to actually improve auction practices or at least make the 
  
 232 See, e.g., NEW THOROUGHBRED OWNERS HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 7 
(“What thrill can match the sight of your horse, bearing a jockey in the colors and 
design you have chosen, blazing through the last furlong of a race and snatching 
victory at the finish line?  Life doesn’t get much better.”).  Romanticized tales of “rags 
to riches” victories proliferate this elusive dream.  “The thing about this game is you 
can get in it.  You don’t need a million dollars.  We did it.  The small guys can do it.  
Anybody can do it.”  Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Ass’n, Thoroughbred 
Ownership (quoting Mike Goetz, co-owner of a Grade 1 winner) (on file with the 
Brooklyn Law Review); see, e.g., FUNNY CIDE TEAM WITH SALLY JENKINS, FUNNY CIDE: 
HOW A HORSE, A TRAINER, A JOCKEY, AND A BUNCH OF HIGH SCHOOL BUDDIES TOOK ON 
THE SHEIKS AND BLUEBLOODS . . . AND WON (2004) (detailing the “out of nowhere” 
success of Funny Cide, the 2003 Kentucky Derby and Preakness Stakes winner). 
 233 Thoroughbred ownership is arguably an even riskier investment for a 
novice than the typical stock investment.  “The speed of an animal and its ability to run 
a distance are variables not subject to market surveys, not influenced by advertising 
and sales techniques, and not obviously subject to rational analysis.”  Miller, supra 
note 5, at 783. 
 234 Secretariat won the Triple Crown (Kentucky Derby, Preakness Stakes, and 
Belmont Stakes) in 1973, the first horse to do so in twenty-five years.  Secretariat was 
inducted into the National Thoroughbred Racing Hall of Fame in 1974.  National 
Museum of Racing and Hall of Fame, Secretariat, http://www.racingmuseum.org/ 
hall/horse.asp?ID=135 (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 235 Like so many novice owners before them, many of these newcomers who 
fall victim to a fraudulent horse deal will “disappear” from the thoroughbred industry 
with only bad memories.  See Paulick, Cot To Be Good, supra note 19. 
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playing field a bit more level, then the Code has fallen short of 
these aspirations in two glaring ways.  First, by bowing to 
consignor pressure and removing medication and surgery 
disclosures from its Code of Ethics,236 TOBA has failed to 
address one of the most pressing issues in racing today, the use 
of anabolic steroids.237  This issue is most certainly on the 
minds of auction participants.  In May of 2006, as part of its 
Sales Integrity Program, TOBA conducted a survey of owners 
who had recently purchased thoroughbreds at auction.238  The 
responses, particularly where research participants were able 
to enter their own comments, clearly indicate that most 
thoroughbred purchasers want full disclosure of surgeries and 
medications, particularly anabolic steroids.239   
Second, and most problematic, the Code completely 
lacks enforcement provisions.240  Although TOBA is a respected 
and influential association, it carries no direct authority over 
anyone but its own members.  Even among its own members, 
the only punishment that TOBA could impose would be to strip 
the violator of his membership.  Assuming this information is 
publicized in some way (which it probably is not), losing one’s 
  
 236 See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text. 
 237 See, e.g., AM. ASS’N OF EQUINE PRACTITIONERS, RECOMMENDATIONS 
CONCERNING MEDICATION IN HORSES PRESENTED FOR SALE AT PUBLIC AUCTION 3, 
available at https://www.aaep.org/pdfs/pressroom/Medication%20in%20Horses%20 
Presented%20for%20Sale%20at%20Public%20Auction.pdf (showing recommendations 
of the American Association of Equine Practitioners’ Task Force on Medication Issues 
at Public Auction, who concluded that “detectable level[s]” of anabolic steroids should 
not be permitted at auctions); Denk, supra note 123 (reporting that officials from 
Keeneland and Fasig-Tipton have formed a committee with various horse racing and 
veterinary professionals in order to develop a  standardized policy for anabolic steroid 
testing at auctions); Finley, supra note 123 (noting that “the racing industry, concerned 
about public perception and safety and integrity issues, may be about to join other 
major sports in banning the use of steroids”); Rachel Pagones, Amy Bennett & Nancy 
Sexton, Horse Racing: Steroid Policy Rethink in US, RACING POST, Jan. 22, 2007, 
Sport, at 18. 
 238 THOROUGHBRED OWNERS AND BREEDERS ASS’N, SALES INTEGRITY PROGRAM 
BUYER SURVEY 1 (2006), http://www.salesintegrity.org/downloads/TOBA%20Report.pdf. 
 239 Among the comments from research participants: “Anabolic steroids should 
have a total ban—zero tolerance;” “Any sellers/consignors involved in this practice 
[giving horses steroids to improve their appearance for sale] should be banned for life 
from the industry;” “Worse than the dishonesty among agents is the drug situation.  
Something must be done to stop the drugging of horses;” “I have purchased numerous 
horses at auction that actually deflated within a week of the sale.  The use of steroids 
and other masking drugs is a larger problem, in my opinion, than the non-disclosure of 
corrective surgery.”  Id. at 19-28 (showing all comments). 
 240 See supra note 223; see also NAT’L CONSUMER COUNCIL (U.K.), supra note 
223, at 51 (noting that in order to have an effective system of regulation, “[t]here must 
be clear, accessible and well-publicised complaints procedures where breach of the code 
is alleged;” and “[t]here must be adequate, meaningful and commercially significant 
sanctions for non-observance”). 
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TOBA membership would result in little more than 
embarrassment.  Unlike the British HRA,241 TOBA has no 
influence on trainers’ licenses, which the states issue.  
Stripping a trainer of his TOBA membership for a Code of 
Ethics violation has absolutely no direct effect on his ability to 
continue working as a trainer.  The threat of revoking TOBA 
membership is furthered weakened by the fact that only a 
small percentage of Code violators would even be TOBA 
members.  Since TOBA focuses only on thoroughbred owners 
and breeders,242 and membership is purely voluntary, many of 
the most common violators, such as bloodstock agents and 
trainers, might not even fit into one of these groups. 
In spite of its shortcomings, the Code of Ethics does 
have some value.  Reputation has always been an integral part 
of the horse racing industry.243  Traditionally, horse deals were 
transacted “between people who knew each other, who had 
dealt with each other before and who would deal with each 
other again.”244  The industry was based on reputation, mutual 
experience, and continued relationships.  Over the years, 
however, “new money” has infiltrated horse racing, 
dramatically shifting the nature of the business from a closed-
in community insulated from risk by expertise and trust based 
on long-lasting relationships, to an open market saturated with 
novice buyers lacking knowledge about thoroughbreds and 
racing industry custom.245    
By spotlighting unscrupulous conduct, the Code has 
reinforced the necessity of owners’ due diligence.  The Code 
itself states that its mission is “to improve the opportunity for 
buyers at auction sales to feel informed, understand the 
various aspects of the process, and be confident they were being 
fairly treated.”246  Novice owners were at a great disadvantage 
when faced with the daunting task of breaking into the 
thoroughbred industry, partly because they were unaware of 
  
 241 Horseracing Regulatory Authority, Licensing Procedure, http://thehra.org/ 
doc.php?id=27295 (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 242 “TOBA’s mission is to improve the economics, integrity and pleasure of the 
sport on behalf of Thoroughbred owners and breeders.”  Thoroughbred Owners and 
Breeders Ass’n, About TOBA, https://www.toba.org/about (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 243 See Miller, supra note 5, at 786. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. at 789; see also Cassidy, supra note 172, at 53 (explaining that “[a]s the 
market for bloodstock grew—particularly during the boom of the 1970s and 
1980s, . . . [t]he cozy intimacy of the bloodstock world was lost”). 
 246 See Sales Integrity Task Force, Mission, supra note 113. 
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the fraud lurking behind these “trade customs.”  Now, at the 
very least, new owners know that “kickbacks” and concealed 
physical defects exist at public auctions.  Armed with this 
knowledge, new owners are better prepared to investigate 
agents before allowing them to bid on their behalf, inquire into 
the ownership of horses they are interested in purchasing, and 
hire veterinarians to thoroughly examine the horses for 
masked defects.  
As in every business transaction, due diligence is crucial 
when one is buying a thoroughbred or choosing a bloodstock 
agent.  “The bottom line, if you’re a buyer, is that you need to 
do your homework,” advises one thoroughbred owner.247  
Although this owner is correct that buyers should “do [their] 
homework,”248 this idealized emphasis on due diligence fails to 
fully take into account the reality of the thoroughbred racing 
industry.  Many new buyers, particularly those for whom 
thoroughbred racing is just a hobby or a side venture, choose to 
employ bloodstock agents to save themselves the time of 
researching all the thoroughbreds for sale, attending the 
auctions, and following through on the transaction.  These 
agents are hired precisely so that owners do not have to do the 
requisite “homework” themselves.  Even if their blind trust is 
not advisable, these owners are paying for a service and they 
deserve to get what they paid for.   
The thoroughbred market, like the stock market, is 
most efficient when transactions are promoted in a setting 
where the costs are as low as possible to the parties involved.  
If principals are required to double-check and investigate every 
move that their agents make, this might prevent the agents 
from violating their fiduciary duties, but this security comes at 
the price of productivity.249  The costs of continuing these 
transactions will eventually become too high, and new buyers 
will no longer invest.250  Since agents are such a vital part of the 
thoroughbred industry, the industry must find a better way to 
police the activity of bloodstock agents and punish those who 
violate their fiduciary duties.  This is not only to protect the 
interests of individual buyers, but also to protect the efficiency 
  
 247 Biles, Code of Ethics, supra note 155. 
 248 Id.   
 249 The cost of agency to the principal goes beyond the monetary compensation 
that he pays his agent.  It includes transaction costs associated with planning and 
monitoring his agent’s work.  Salacuse, supra note 163, at 165. 
 250 See id. 
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of the market, and ultimately, the survival of the industry 
itself.   
Agency law binds these agents to various duties, but 
“agency law” cannot police the thoroughbred industry.  It is up 
to the industry itself to ensure that violations of these duties 
are detected and dealt with accordingly.  A code of ethics is an 
integral part of a unified system of self-regulation, but without 
anyone or anything to oversee this “regulation,” a code of ethics 
will never have much of an impact. 
There are, of course, some drawbacks to industry self-
regulation.  Allowing an industry to regulate itself presents the 
risk that nothing will be done, or that self-regulation is merely 
a “shield to ward off more meaningful regulation.”251  There is 
also the concern that those in charge of regulation will prevent 
the industry from modifying its practices because the old 
system is economically beneficial to them.252  For example, the 
veteran horsemen who currently lead the industry are in a 
better position to succeed than new investors, due to the 
veterans’ years of experience in the business.  Even though the 
current system of regulation is deficient, it is serving them well 
because they know what to watch out for and who to trust.  In 
contrast, newcomers often have no racing industry experience 
to draw from when choosing horses or hiring a bloodstock 
agent.  Since newcomers are most likely to be affected by 
auction fraud, a better-regulated system of fraud prevention, 
detection, and adjudication best serves their interests.  The 
risk is that a governance system controlled by veteran 
horsemen might not regulate these problems as diligently as it 
would if the veterans themselves were most affected by the 
fraud.253 
Despite the drawbacks of self-regulation, the 
thoroughbred industry is quite resistant to federal regulation 
for its auctions254 and it is unlikely that the industry will ever 
  
 251 Dale A. Oesterle, Comments on the SEC’s Market 2000 Report: On, Among 
Other Things, Deference to SROs, the Mirage of Price Improvement, the Arrogation of 
Property Rights in Order Flow, and SEC Incrementalism, 19 J. CORP. L. 483, 489 
(1994) (quoting SUBCOMM. ON SEC., S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS, 
SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, S. Doc. No. 13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 145 (1973)). 
 252 Id. (quoting SUBCOMM. ON SEC., S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN 
AFFAIRS, supra note 251, at 145). 
 253 See id. (quoting SUBCOMM. ON SEC., S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & 
URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 251, at 145). 
 254 See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 19 (“No one in his right mind would 
entertain this.”); Lucas Marquardt, A Breath of Fresh Air: Q&A with Satish Sanan 
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embrace such government oversight.  Excluding government 
regulation as a possibility, the only viable option for improving 
auction practices is for the industry to develop a centralized 
system of regulation.  The industry has already modeled its 
Code of Ethics after the British Code of Practice, so perhaps the 
American industry should also modify its regulatory structure 
(or complete lack thereof) to more closely resemble that of the 
United Kingdom.255  No system is perfect, but having an official 
body in charge of regulatory oversight for thoroughbred sales 
would vastly improve the situation.  
Although it remains uncertain exactly how the industry 
could implement this structural overhaul, its necessity is clear.  
By developing an official authority within the thoroughbred 
sales business, the industry can adopt and implement a 
standardized set of regulations to govern all public auctions.  
Up to this point, the U.S. thoroughbred industry’s focus has 
been exclusively on fraudulent misrepresentation in the public 
auction setting, but the success of this system could lead to 
extending the official agency’s authority to include private 
sales as well.256  It might even be advisable to pursue state 
licensing of bloodstock agents to ensure greater oversight into 
their activities and stricter penalties for unscrupulous 
conduct.257     
The Code of Ethics for Thoroughbred Auctions 
successfully brings the industry’s focus back onto reputation 
and due diligence.  These had always been vital features of 
horse racing, long before novice horsemen infiltrated the racing 
world, bringing “new money,” new customs, and new 
problems.258  Although due diligence is an important 
consideration in all business transactions, the American 
thoroughbred industry can do better, and must do better, to 
maintain its current investors and continue attracting new 
  
(“Our game plan is to avoid government agencies if we can,” states Sanan.) (on file with 
the Brooklyn Law Review). 
 255 For a discussion of the regulatory structure of horse racing in the United 
Kingdom, see supra Part V.B.1. 
 256 Unlike TOBA’s Code of Ethics, the British Code of Practice applies to 
private sales as well as public auctions.  See THE JOCKEY CLUB, CODE OF PRACTICE, 
supra note 10. 
 257 Many horsemen, including Jess Jackson, have supported this idea of 
licensing bloodstock agents.  However, others have criticized the proposal, citing the 
impracticability of requiring state licenses in an international business like 
thoroughbred sales.  See Mary Meehan, Jess Jackson Backs Licensing, Disclosure, 
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Ky.), May 4, 2006, at A1. 
 258 See Miller, supra note 5, at 789. 
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ones.259  The horse racing industry needs to implement an 
official body to effectively enforce the Code of Ethics and other 
horse sale regulations. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Code of Ethics for Thoroughbred Auctions is an 
important step in the industry’s efforts to improve auction 
practices, but it probably should not have been its first step.  
TOBA and its supporters adopted the Code with the best of 
intentions.  The Code of Ethics has tremendous potential to 
effectuate real change by standardizing approved auction 
practices, but its proponents have gotten way ahead of 
themselves.  Without a regulatory body similar to the United 
Kingdom’s Horseracing Regulatory Authority to implement the 
Code of Ethics, its provisions are little more than “window-
dressing,”260 or “merely a piece of paper with words.”261 
The U.S. thoroughbred industry should develop a 
centralized regulatory body to, among other duties, enforce the 
Code of Ethics for Thoroughbred Auctions.  By implementing 
this new agency within the industry, the racing world could 
provide new investors with more than false hope of procedural 
fairness.  Investing in racehorses will always be a risky 
venture; economic success can never be guaranteed.  Adopting 
an effective system of self-regulation that investigates and 
punishes instances of dual agency, undisclosed commissions, 
and artificially represented horses will not safeguard these 
investments.  It will, however, contain the risk to that which 
has always been a part of horse racing—a risk that new 
investors have shown they are willing to take. 
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 259 See US: Sanan Calls for Sale Reform, RACING AND SPORTS (Austl.), July 6, 
2004, available at http://www.iskander.com.au/breeding/rsNewsArt.asp?NID=44265 
(quoting Satish Sanan, who argues that the thoroughbred industry needs to make 
major changes in order to maintain its appeal to new owners and also current owners). 
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